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they  take  the  external  approach  to  rely  on  untenable  metaphysical 
assumptions  about  the world’s  structure.   Moreover,  some  internalists 
take  the  permutability—i.e.  the  consistent  reinterpretation—of  certain 
referential schemes  to confound  the externalist picture of reference.    In 
this thesis I focus on the reference of theoretical terms  in science, and I 
argue for an externalist treatment of natural kinds and other theoretical 
elements.    Along  the  way  I  offer  a  defense  of  the  externalist’s  pre‐
theoretic metaphysical assumptions and emphasize  their central role  in 
the  interpretation  of  scientific  languages.    The  externalist  approach 
acknowledges the necessary constraints on reference‐fixing that account 
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Chapter 1
''Reality  is  that  which, when  you  stop  believing  in  it, doesn't  go
away.''— Philip K. Dick
1.1 Introduction: Reference in Language and Science
The first clear case of my daughter's referring in the English language came with
her utterance, ''dog''. By 'referring', I mean that after a lengthy span of random
babble, ''dog'' was the first bit of language she used repeatedly and correctly in the
presence of an appropriate stimulus. Her repeated utterance of ''dog'' in suitable
situations is what makes it reasonable to conclude that she is using the term in
reference to the proximate dog.1 However, her ability to do so is only the result of
agreeable reinforcement from onlookers upon instances of her successfully aping
their behaviour.
One way to conceive of the situation is that of an everyday causal mode of
linguistic acquisition, where a term is passed from some previous user(s) to a new
one; the new acquisition being one link in an historical chain of similar causal links
from user to user. Some have thought to conceive of the term 'dog' as originating
in a dubbing, or baptismal, ceremony, where its name was assigned as part of
the name-related linguistic practices of our society. It is helpful to conceive of the
term's meaning in this causal-historical way, according to proponents of this view,
because it provides, in the form of a direct causal chain of events, an account of
the nature in which the name of some thing can be said to refer to that object.
1Here, for commonsense reasons, I am setting aside Quinean worries about the inscrutability
of reference—that she may have meant, for example, 'undetatched dog parts' or 'temporal dog
slices'—since she is only a toddler who presumably lacks the conceptual wherewithal to construct
those alternatives.
1
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However, with advancements in biological science the term ''dog'' (specifically,
its scientific equivalent ''canidae'') has become a theoretical term used to denote a
biological kind, examples of which are taken to satisfy certain conditions for their
designation as such. Clearly my daughter does not use the term in the preced-
ing sense. Nevertheless, over time elements of the scientific description of ''dog''
will permeate her understanding and, via a 'division of linguistic labour' (Putnam,
1979b), she will refer to dogs in a sense quite different from the one reflecting her
present stage of development.
Another way to causally conceive of the scenario is as follows. When my
daughter  points  and  utters  ''dog''  in  the  presence  of  one, information  is  de-
flected/emitted from the proximate dog and the specific information engenders
structured neural activity that prompt her utterance from an associated memory
of the affirmed correlation between the term and its associated stimulus. The pre-
ceding explanation is couched in terms of more fundamental causal processes and
mechanisms—ones that are assumed by the natural sciences to obtain. Explana-
tions of this sort usually involve more 'basic', non-ostensive elements of the natural
world in such a manner as to make them available for reference. Contrast this with
the former referential account of ''dog'', where the term's reference is conceived as
being 'borrowed' from other users via a series historical causal relations linking
back to the term's baptism.
In learning, many of the terms we employ seem to be fixed in the manner of
the preceding 'dog' example—by rote conditioning during our formative years.
Names are attached to specific ostensive things, or classes of things, and this en-
ables for a certain degree of successful communication between members of a lin-
guistic community. In contrast, other terms we use are invariably theory-laden:
using them correctly depends on some knowledge of the meanings of the terms
used to define them, and this usually involves some understanding of a term's role
in a greater network of term-meanings, as well as grasping its meaning relative to
appropriate contexts for its use. Fortunately, over time and in varying ways we
learn how to use such terms and apply them to aspects of the world.
Cases like my daughter's acquisition of the concept ''dog'' and her subsequent
use of the term in reference are, from a certain external perspective, straightfor-
wardly causal: they can be explained in virtue of the term's causal history and/or
the causal processes and mechanisms upon which those histories are taken to su-
pervene. In recent years the 'causal', or 'direct', approach to providing an account
of reference for natural kind terms in science has become something of a philosoph-
ical movement. A question I engage in the latter portion of this essay is whether,
and to what extent, causality can work to successfully anchor the theoretical terms
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of scientific theories to their supposed referents.
Science is incontrovertibly our best epistemic engine. Anyone wishing to se-
riously challenge this view must explain its overwhelming success. How is it
that helicopters work the way we intend them to, that antibiotics do what we
expect and design them to do, and that we can accurately predict—down to the
minute—each arrival of Halley's Comet? One popular view motivated by the suc-
cess of science, yet sensitive to its history, takes mature scientific theories—the
ones used to underwrite our scientific projects and experiments—as approximately
true: where those theories err they are relatively negligible errors of detail. Were
this not the case—so the argument goes—the overall success of science would be
miraculous (Putnam, 1975: 173). The preceding general argument is taken by some
to provide the justificatory basis for scientific realism.
Another question I engage—specifically in this introductory chapter—is how,
if at all, a scientific realism born from an abductive inference from the success of
science relates to orthodox metaphysical realism? My aim in examining the pre-
ceding question is to provide a backdrop for another question central to this essay:
the legitimacy of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical
realism. In order to examine the nature of realism in a scientific context I consider
several strategies for construing and expressing what our scientific theories say.
Each of these strategies attempts to make clear the relations between scientific lan-
guage and reality, and between truth, knowledge and belief. I show that, in light
of problems illuminated by these theoretical reconstructions, we can (cautiously)
accept the gist of a weaker realist stance—a view I call proto-realism—yet reject the
orthodox form of metaphysical realism.
1.2 Realism and Anti-realism: A Primer
Realism concerns the truth and meaning of entire sentences, propositions, and be-
liefs (henceforth, 'sentences+.'), and it can be expressed in two basic theses. First,
sentences+ about particular entities, certain classes of entities, or some subject
matter have (on suitable occasions) truth conditions which are mind/language-
independent. Equivalently, one might say that there are objective conditions of the
world that must obtain in order for sentences+ to be true. Second is the thesis that
some of the sentences+ about those entities or subject matter actually are true, and
they are true independent of whether human beings, or any other knowers, take
them to be so. Such realists apply these theses to the world conceived as an object
itself; they assume that the universe exists and that it does so independent of how
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we take it to be. Moreover, and more importantly, metaphysical realists append
this view with the following proviso: unless the world consists of some fixed to-
tality of metaphysical 'world-stuff' (objects, properties, entities, events, relations,
etc.) to which we can determinately refer, sentences+ about that stuff cannot be
objectively true. Since knowing about the world involves some measure of equiv-
alence between the content of our sentences+ about the world, and the way the
world really is—i.e. a correspondence relation—without the independent existence
of 'world-stuff' to fix truth conditions for those sentences+ we can have no objective
true beliefs about the world.
Beliefs in this context should be construed as phenomenological evaluations
of situations in the world. That is to say, our sensory modalities provide most
of the raw material about those situations, and our beliefs constitute a cognitive
appraisal of that raw material. In other words, our beliefs are judgments about
certain representations of those situations, and those judgments, or attitudes, are
themselves a form of valuative representation whose intentional object is the more
basic, situational kind of representation. Scientific realists hold that science is the
best mechanism by which to calibrate our beliefs about the world. This is so not
only because science has proven overwhelmingly successful, but also because of
the methodology underlying scientific investigation.
The 'hard sciences'—physics, chemistry and certain areas in biology—provide
the most exhaustive inventory of metaphysical world-stuff. They do so by in-
dexing the world's measurable properties, tracking the relations those properties
fall into, and inferring theorems about how those properties change under vary-
ing conditions. Scientists use the data collected from experimental observation to
determine the kinds of things there are, some of which are not directly observ-
able. Unobservable theoretical posits are usually inferred from a combination of
the available data and laws held to govern the behaviour of other well-understood
posits.
Some scientific realists (e.g. Boyd, 1983; Psillos, 1999) see the aim of science
as uncovering which sentences+ about our domain of naturalistic discourse are
true. These realists take our best scientific theories as true, or approximately true,
linguistic descriptions of their intended domains. Proponents of this view take the-
ories to be linguistic entities and, as such, they take the theoretical terms of mature
theories determinately refer. On this view, if a scientific theory is true, it is also
true that its posits genuinely inhabit the world.
It is possible, however, to agree with the metaphysical realist that the world
exists independently of how we believe it to be, and agree that science is our best
epistemic engine, yet deny the first realist thesis—that the truth conditions of sen-
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tences about certain entities and subject matter are mind/language-independent.
Semantic antirealists offer an alternative account of what it takes for sentences+
to be true that is motivated, in part, by how mysterious the realist's, so-called,
correspondence relation between sentences and the world actually is. The precise
meaning of 'correspondence' has been exceedingly difficult for metaphysical real-
ists to make clear. In order to avoid opacity they must provide a satisfactory ac-
count of 'facts'; that is, precisely explain the relations between facts, terms/words,
sentences, and the world. But realists have failed to achieve broad consensus on
any one such account, let alone offer one without important difficulties.2
Metaphysical realists claim that the truth conditions for sentences+ are deter-
mined independent from the minds that apprehend them, so it follows from this
that even our best scientific theories—the theory of evolution by natural selec-
tion, the double-helical model of DNA, quantum field theory, etc.—might still
be false. To be sure, no reasonable person will deny that even our best theories
are defeasible, but semantic antirealists are skeptical about the metaphysical re-
alist's view that there is an objective sense of truth that obtains independent of
knowers. For example, holding a particular theory as strongly confirmed, pre-
dictively successful and coherent with relevant evidence is insufficient for the or-
thodox realist to reckon that theory objectively true. This is an important point of
departure between orthodox metaphysical realists and other realists for whom the
above—in addition to other theoretical virtues (i.e. simplicity, elegance, fecundity,
scope, etc.)—constitute the best possible ground for holding a theory objectively3
true.
Furthermore, it is not clear to the semantic antirealist that grasping a truth con-
dition for a sentence+ involves anything over and above understanding some min-
imal evidentiary condition for its assertion (or belief). If this view is correct, then
both language and knowledge are inherent to the notion of truth. After all, grasp-
ing a truth condition involves, among other things, having some notion about
what constitutes evidence for a warranted assertion (stated, presumably, in some
language). So, semantic antirealists view the grasping of a truth condition for
an assertion as more akin to a practical skill. In highly-specialized sciences this
translates as having warrant (be it via some mathematical proof, some empirical
ground, or some composite of corroborative evidence) for, say, an existential claim
for a specific entity. All this, of course, runs contrary to realist orthodoxy, which
2See Lewis' ''Forget about the 'correspondence theory of truth''', Analysis v.61, n.272, October
2001 , pp. 275-280(6) for a analysis of the many problems plaguing the correspondence theory.
3I use scare quotes here to highlight the distinction between the absolute sense of 'objective' held
by the realist, and the pragmatic sense of 'objective' held by the semantic antirealist.
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takes truth to be an wholly non-epistemic condition. In sum, semantic antirealists
disagree that truth is a property provincial to metaphysical realists alone.
Another important strain of anti-realism is error theory. Although we often de-
ploy a realist semantics in domains where evidentiary constraints are troublesome
in principle (e.g. purely theoretical domains, where entities and their attendant
properties are wholly inferred), certain error theorists claim that the prima facie
'true' claims we make about those domains are, strictly speaking, false. Consider
Hartry Field's (1980) notable error-theoretic account of mathematics. For Field
the truth of the sentence, '23 is prime', involves an implicit existential assertion
about an abstract object—in this case, the number 23. Platonists are realists about
numbers so, in addition to the view that the number 23 exists, they hold it bears
the property of being prime independent of our (or any other knowers') ability to
know so. In their criticism of Platonism, nominalists often point to an important
distinction between abstract and concrete objects: the former are spatiotemporally
nonlocated and causally inert whereas the latter are inversely so. For a nominal-
ist like Field the distinction demarcates the boundary separating things that exist
from those that do not. Field is therefore an error-theorist with respect to arith-
metic: mathematical objects are abstract, so they do not exist. Hence, a sentence
like '23 is prime' is in principle false. However, despite its literal falsehood we
should continue to deploy a realist semantics in the domain of arithmetic because
natural science—an ex hypothesi good thing—requires us to do so.
Field's approach is similar to Bas van Fraassen's treatment of scientific theories.
For van Fraassen, science continues and ought to continue deploying a realist se-
mantics with respect to our best theories, but we cannot be certain about the truth
of existential assertions involving unobservable entities. Hence, it is always more
rational to be agnostic about the truth of theories involving unobservable entities
than to wholesale accept them as true.
It is apt to conclude this section with an emphasis on anti-realism since the seg-
ment immediately following introduces an argument that anticipates the strategy
employed by Putnam in his influential argument against metaphysical realism—a
principal topic at issue in this essay. The 'Newman objection' to Russell's struc-
tural realism is relevant because it shows that purely structuralist meta-theories
all succumb to the same difficulty: they carry the unwanted and unacceptable im-
plication that scientific theories are not empirical.
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1.3 Russell's Structuralism and Newman's Objection
An important philosophical concern has been the problem of reconciling the pre-
vailing scientific view with our 'folk theory' of the world that includes familiar
objects of everyday experience (e.g. apples, people, mountains, etc.). Empirical
science is loosely partitioned into domains of study, each of which has a vocabu-
lary used to name and classify the things it takes to exist. But squaring elements
in one domain with elements from another has been exceedingly difficult. Con-
sider, for example, the difficulty in specifying the conditions for something like
an ecosystem in the language of particle physics. Even more perplexing is the no-
tion of specifying something like a bicycle—an object whose existence nobody de-
nies—in purely physicalist terminology. However, the twentieth century ushered
in major revolutions in both physics and logic that equipped philosophers with
what an ambitious few of them believed were the formal resources with which to
successfully reconcile the phenomenal and theoretical worlds. One such attempt
was advanced by Bertrand Russell.
Russell's theory of theories in The Analysis of Matter (1954) is the historical pre-
decessor of what is nowadays called structural realism, or structuralism. His ver-
sion is rooted in a form/content distinction where the objective properties and
relations of the mind-independent external world are its structural properties and
relations, which are known indirectly by scientific description. The subjective, ev-
eryday properties and relations constituting the content of human experience are
intrinsic, and known directly via the senses. On this view, the external world-
structure consists of second-order properties and relations of those intrinsic, first-
order phenomenal properties and relations. It should be noted that when Rus-
sell uses the terms, 'structure' and 'structural properties', he explicitly means sets
(some of whose elements may themselves be other sets). When referring to our
phenomenal experience—i.e. how things seem to us—the terms we use denote
properties and relations of individuals, whereas our theoretical vocabulary de-
notes properties and relations of those phenomenal properties and relations; that
is, they refer to sets of sets. So, for example, upon hearing a gunshot that I de-
scribe as a 'sound' that is 'loud' and 'shrill', such terms refer to first order, intrinsic
properties and relations that constitute—in Russell's dated jargon—my auditory
''percepts''. In contrast, a measurement of the same phenomena in terms of, say,
decibels, constitutes a value for a variable of a second-order, structural property.
This reconstruction mirrors Russell's definition4 of cardinal numbers as being con-
structed from sets of sets.
4In Principia Mathematica.
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A short digression is relevant to discuss some features of Russell's overall strat-
egy, and the general worries that motivated him. Reference to individual, concrete
things—like persons, soccer balls and geographic regions—are particularly prob-
lematic for someone like Russell, who has an internalist view of representation that
emphasizes percepts (sometimes called 'sense data'). Such external, worldly ob-
jects are paradigm cases of things we take to exist, but which are not, strictly speak-
ing, denizens of the internal world; they are not the kinds of things with which we
are acquainted. Russell's descriptivist strategy is to explain the capacity to refer
to concrete individuals in terms of the capacity to refer to the properties and rela-
tions that are exemplified by those individuals. His description theory of reference
is an outgrowth of Gottlob Frege's thoughts about reference, with some important
philosophical differences.5 The descriptivist theory construes terms/names as de-
noting phrases that are analyzed into existentially quantified logical constructions.
Such phrases denote—or refer—to the extent that there is an object that satisfies
the definite description. On the descriptivist view, the reference of a term/name is
mediated by the proposition in which it features. So, on the Russellian picture, the
values for existentially quantified variables in each denoting phrase are provided
by our percepts.
Russell was aware of, and motivated by, the philosophical problems that ac-
company claims of determinate reference for scientific terms. First, one need only
undertake a cursory review of the history of science to appreciate that it reads like a
chronicle of outmoded theories. Moreover, as theories are succeeded—especially
during occasions of revolutionary change—a successor theory will often disavow
an earlier theory's posits. A classic example—and one that Russell had, at the time,
just witnessed—is that of luminiferous aether, a theoretical posit taken at the time
to be the medium in which light propagated. Aether theory was eventually su-
perseded following Einstein's advancement of the special theory of relativity in
1905. The point is that, clearly, any such example should diminish our confidence
that the entities existentially quantified in even our best scientific theories have
concrete existence. But another problem pervasive in science, and particularly
disconcerting in physics, is that most classes of scientific entity seem systemati-
cally explicable in terms of sets of more basic entity classes. Hence, we face the
5Here it should be mentioned that, whereas Frege and Russell are often taken as sharing a simi-
lar descriptivist strategy, their respective conceptions of a proposition differ significantly. Specifi-
cally, Frege rejected the view that a physical object could be the constuent of a proposition. Russell
disagreed, holding that propositions might indeed have physical objects as components, claiming
that such propositions could be grasped only by someone who is acquainted with all of the con-
stituents of the proposition, where acquaintance requires the kind of perfect and complete knowl-
edge that we can have only in virtue of universals.
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venerable problem of infinite ontological regress.
Russell's theory was meant to allay these concerns by explaining the theoretical
predicates of scientific theories non-reductively,6 since they are only indirectly re-
lated to the world. That is, the reference of theoretical posits can be explained only
in terms of the reference of the observational properties and relations of the theory;
this curtails the problem of ontological regression because all theoretical terms re-
fer to properties and relations that constitute second-order (or higher) subclasses of
properties and relations of first-order individuals. In other words, the ontological
buck stops at phenomena. To reprise an earlier example, if an instrument is used to
measure the sound of a gunshot, the sound might be measured and quantified in
decibels. 'Decibel', given this picture, is a higher-order property whose referents
are the related (first-order) percepts of the instrument-reading, gunshot-hearing
observer. Theoretical terms refer to the world only indirectly because their ref-
erents are always first-order phenomenal properties. Structural realists take this
view to dispel concerns over theory change in the following way. Although the
conceptual posits of a particular theory may be succeeded by another that is, for
example, more elegant, predictively powerful, and coherent with available data,
both its observations (and their consequences) and (many of) the theory's substruc-
tural elements are preserved from one theory to the next. So, when theories change
the primary ingredients in Russell's reconstructions are taken by structuralists to
survive the transition.
Russell's view came under fire in a 1928 article by Cambridge mathematician,
Max Newman, whose objection concerned the obvious empirical character of sci-
entific theories. Specifically, Newman held that on any reasonable account of sci-
entific knowledge it must be the case that true scientific claims are non-trivial.
Russell's account of theories, Newman argued, fails on this commonsense require-
ment. Newman showed that any set of empirical objects of sufficient cardinality
can be used to construct any theoretical structure, since a structure is merely a set
of sets of objects. Scientific theories, on Russell's view, provide structures that are
second-order properties and relations of our observations. In set-theoretic terms
these properties and relations translate as sets of sets of sets of…objects. But any
second-order structure which satisfies any basic class of objects of a given car-
dinality up to isomorphism also satisfies any other class of objects of the same
cardinality. This, of course, gives rise to important questions regarding the evi-
dential basis for choosing a particular structure, since isomorphic structures are
constrained only by cardinality. That is to say, if scientific theories represent the
6I use ''non-reductively'' in the sense whereby reduction constitutes explanation only in more-
fundamental, theoretical terms.
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world only in virtue of such isomorphisms holding, then knowing that a scien-
tific theory is true amounts to knowing only that the theory's target system—what
the theory represents—has a specific set-theoretic structure. The problem under-
scored in Newman's critique was that Russell's theory offers no way to distinguish
an empirical structure from a non-empirical, albeit isomorphic equivalent. New-
man showed that any and all isomorphic structures that satisfy the phenomenal
vocabulary also come out true, making a purely structural theory of the world only
trivially true. Hence, in order to evade triviality an account of theories requires
some way to distinguish the empirically relevant from the empirically irrelevant
isomorphic structures. But, as Russell duly conceded,7 the requisite distinction
cannot be drawn from within a purely structuralist framework.
Newman's argument is significant for a number of reasons. Mainly, it threatens
the realist component of Russell's doctrine. If structure constitutes the objective
properties of reality that we can know, yet any isomorphic structure satisfying the
phenomenal vocabulary of the theory comes out true, our scientific knowledge of
the world—purportedly the best kind of knowledge there is—is only trivially true.
Hence, the structural realist faces the problem that her formal reconstructions of
scientific theories require an interpretation to evade triviality.
1.4 Ramsey, Carnap and the 'Received View' of Theo-
ries
Another respect in which the Russell-Newman exchange is significant is the role
it played in influencing subsequent attempts to formally reconstruct our scien-
tific knowledge.8 Russell's logic and his ensuing formulation of scientific theories
served as the launching platform for the philosophical movement known as Log-
ical Positivism. The notion that scientific theories might be expressed as sets of
truth-bearing sentences in the language of logic strongly appealed to a group of
(predominantly) German and Austrian philosophers and scientists. They believed
that rational reconstructions of our theories would enable them to display, explic-
itly and clearly, the relationships of meaning and evidence that confer a special
status on the sciences. The Positivists' approach to theories was undertaken as
part of a more general program aimed at discrediting what they saw as a disturb-
7Russell's  concession came in a letter  to Newman, quoted in its  entirety by Demopoulos-
Friedman (1985).
8Demopoulos-Friedman (1985) draws out these comparisons at greater length and in greater
detail.
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ing trend toward metaphysical obscurantism, popularized most notably by G.W.F.
Hegel and his followers.
The 'new' logic—introduced by Frege and further developed by Russell and
A.N. Whitehead—provided scientific meta-theorists with a formal vocabulary by
which to express scientific inferences. However, Newman showed that the empir-
ical character of scientific theory mandates an experientially legitimate interpre-
tation of the structures which appear in them. To mitigate this difficulty Russell's
followers assumed the notion that observable objects have observable properties,
and they took this view to be unproblematic. In rational reconstructions such ob-
jects and properties were expressed in what became known as the 'observational
vocabulary', which was taken by the Positivists as empirically meaningful. More-
over, any statement formed out of the logical vocabulary combined with the obser-
vational vocabulary likewise counted as empirically meaningful. Thus, the chal-
lenge for the post-Russellians (the Positivists, in particular) became the following:
how might one give meaning to theoretical terms that are neither part of the obser-
vational vocabulary nor the logical vocabulary?
1.4.1 Ramsey
An influential figure sandwiched between Russell and the Positivists was Cam-
bridge philosopher, F.P.  Ramsey. Inspired by the Russell-Newman exchange,
and troubled by the problem of defining theoretical terms, Ramsey developed a
method for eliminating overt reference to theoretical posits in the formal recon-
struction of scientific theory. Overt appeal to such entities was viewed as prob-
lematic because, after all, unobservables are not empirical—they are inferred from
the continuities and changes among clusters of variable values—namely, measure-
ments. In addition, the dubious ontological status of certain theoretical posits was
illuminated by the recent Einsteinian revolution in physics, where, for example,
terms such as ''mass'' were completely redefined.
Ramsey's strategy for answering the problem of defining the theoretical vocab-
ulary runs as follows. Take the axioms of the formal system (for convenience, sup-
posed to be formulated in first-order predicate logic) which expresses the scientific
theory in question; substitute every theoretical constant with a distinct variable,
then apply existential quantification over the propositional and property matrices
thus obtained. Introduce laws, or axioms T(Φ1,…Φn) and correspondence rules
(rules that explicitly link some of the theoretical terms to terms whose meanings
are given directly in observation) C(Φ1…, Φn) which contain Vtterms Φ1,…,Φn:
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(∃Φ∗1) . . . (∃Φ∗n)[T*(Φ∗1, . . . , Φ∗n) ∧ C*(Φ∗1, . . . , Φ∗n)] (1.1)
where the Vt predicate terms Φ1…, Φn in T and C are replaced by the distinct pred-
icate variables Φ∗1,…,Φ∗n thereby obtaining T* and C*.9 Ramsey called the the-
ory's observational vocabulary its 'primary system' and its theoretical vocabulary
its 'secondary system'. Later Rudolph Carnap successfully proved that a sentence
stated in the primary system follows from the theory if and only if it follows also
from the Ramsey sentence of the theory.
The significance of Ramsey's contribution is this. Although theoretical terms
and predicates are pervasive in scientific theories, the really important feature, as
Newman stressed, is the theory's empirical content. In the legitimate reconstruc-
tion of a given theory, we need not treat its theoretical terms and predicates as
''names'', or entities. Rather, by treating them as genuine variables bound by ex-
istential quantifiers we can construct a truth-valued sentence instead of an open
formula, and the sentence can thereby be used to express a cognitive judgement.
Moreover, the Ramsey sentence implies that not all correspondence statements
are false, which entails that the theory is realized by the world. Hence, implicit
in the Ramsey sentence is the view that there are Russellian structures that realize
the Ramsey sentence, but the Ramsey sentence itself does not commit the theory
to the existence of any specific set of structures. Hence, a 'Ramseyfied' theory is
understood as cognitively meaningful via the conjunction of its empirical content
along with its implicit claim of realization.
1.4.2 Carnap
Strongly influenced by the work of Russell and Ramsey, Carnap developed a the-
ory of theories as partially interpreted formal systems, and his mature formulation
of this system became the paradigm by which Positivists construed scientific the-
ories. Carnap (1967: 5) even adorned his Aufbau with an introductory motto from
Russell: ''The supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing is this: Whenever pos-
sible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.'' Russell's
form-content distinction was retained, as was the notion of a logical structure,
but Carnap ambitiously held that all concepts of science could be explicitly de-
fined within a single constructional system. In other words, he aimed for complete
formalization where an entire theory might be expressed as a set of deductively
9Suppe (2000), 390.
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closed sentences in the language of logic. Carnap's mature system was so influen-
tial among his peers and followers that it became known as the 'received view of
theories'.
Recall that Russell formulated our objective knowledge by using 'experiential'
properties to form higher-order theoretical structures. Carnap, on the other hand,
follows Ramsey by eliminating higher-order structures and recasting them as vari-
ables of first-order individuals. Focusing instead on separating the factual from the
non-factual content of a physical theory, Carnap took the factual to be exhausted
by the theory's Ramsey sentence.
Carnap frequently emphasized that virtually every unreconstructed
sentence of the language of science and everyday life has both factual
and non-factual aspects, so that the sharp separation of our language
into factual and non-factual sentences is meaningful only relative to a
reconstruction of that language.'' (Demopoulos, 2003: 384)
Carnap then isolates the non-factual content by way of the 'Carnap sentence',
C(◊) = (R(◊) =∆ ◊) (1.2)
where C is the Carnap sentence, R is a Ramsey sentence, and ◊ is the theory in ques-
tion. The factual content of ◊ is associated with R(◊) because the observational con-
sequences of R(◊) and ◊ are equivalent. Furthermore, the Carnap sentence—like
the Ramsey sentence—expresses the claim that it must be the referents of the terms
of the unreconstructed portion of the theory that satisfy the matrix of R(◊).
In  reconstructing  our  theories, Carnap—like  Russell  and  Ramsey  before
him—attempts to show that we can give an authentic representation of the the-
oretical knowledge offered by our best scientific theories. It is done by carving a
clear distinction, within the theory's domain, between the observational and the
theoretical. If we segregate the observable part of any intended model of ◊ we can
then introduce a set of observational predicates (O-predicates) into a reconstructed
language for ◊. The intended model just is the unreconstructed theory, so the O-
predicates are defined in terms of their being a subset of observable elements in
the domain of ◊. The reconstruction is 'partially' interpreted because the interpre-
tation of ◊, I(◊), is extended only to observational terms, which are presumed to
be given a complete empirical interpretation. The theoretical terms are left with
only an indirect empirical interpretation provided by an implicit definition from
within the axiom system. Like Russell, Carnap assumed that the logically prim-
itive predicate expressions—ones we can justifiably assume to understand—are
those restricted to genuinely empirical/phenomenal objects. Demopoulos (ibid:
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386) observes that without such an assumption, ''…the empiricist motivation for
distinguishing between the O- and T-vocabularies—and, therefore, Ramsey's pri-
mary and secondary systems—would be lost.'' Thus, the factual content of ◊ con-
sists in its consequences expressed in its O-language, whereas claims involving the
theoretical elements of the theory are understood as purely logical: their reference
need only involve the appropriate logical category and arity.
The Carnap-Ramsey approach attempts to answer the question of how a the-
ory's language is fixed according to its standard interpretation by altogether elim-
inating the theoretical vocabulary from a theory's rational reconstruction. So, de-
spite its providing an interpretation for the reference of terms in a theory's obser-
vational vocabulary, it offers no interpretation for the reference of terms in the
theoretical vocabulary; accordingly, the theoretical portion of Carnap's system is
susceptible to Newman's criticism. This, of course, means that claims about the ex-
istence of specific theoretical entities are inferred from uninterpreted formal sen-
tences. Consequently, critics of Carnap's programme have belabored the point
that his system implies an instrumentalist, or antirealist, stance toward scientific
theories—an unfortunate problem Carl Hempel (1958) dubbed, ''the theoretician's
dilemma''.
The Carnap-Ramsey approach to theories is implicated in Putnam's model-
theoretic argument against metaphysical realism, in that Putnam attempts to show
that a realist variation on the Carnap-Ramsey strategy (i.e. one that extends an
interpretation to the theoretical vocabulary) is susceptible to an argument paral-
lel to that which Russell faced from Newman.10 In the following section I discus
the apparent successor to the Ramsey-Carnap view of theories. The 'semantic',
or 'model-theoretic', approach offers an altogether different strategy for formally
reconstructing our scientific theories—one that some of its proponents believe per-
mits for a less problematic treatment of the issues afflicting the received view (van
Fraassen 1985: 289).
1.5 Models, Theory  Modeling, and  the  'Semantic'
View
Recall that Newman observed a problem faced by any purely structural/ formal
account of theories: since our knowledge of structure is clearly nontrivial—i.e.,
10It should be noted that Putnam does not cite Newman as influencing his formulation of the
model-theoretic argument and, in fact, claims to have developed the argument independent of
Newman's critique.
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since we do not just stipulate the structures of our theories—it cannot be the case
that our knowledge of the non-perceptible world is limited to knowledge of its
structure. Acknowledgment of the preceding, and concession that it has proven
virtually impossible to adequately capture a mature scientific theory in a formal,
deductively closed, linguistic reconstruction,11 has caused critics of the received
view to coalesce around an alternative strategy for reconstructing scientific theo-
ries: the model-theoretic, or 'semantic', view of theories.
In science, 'modeling' a system is usually understood as involving the construc-
tion of a representation that helps describe and explain the system. Whereas, for
example, engineers and architects design a priori models—e.g. schematic illustra-
tions, scale replicas, 'blueprints', etc.—of a system yet to be constructed, 'modeling'
a system is more often understood as a reversal of this process: an existing target
system is examined relative to some general assumptions, and a model, or repre-
sentation, of the system is created in abstraction and expressed in a language, or
languages, deemed suitable to capture the system's salient features. One way to
characterize the role of models in the practice of science is to view them as analo-
gies. For example, the 'billiard-ball' model of gasses constitutes a depiction in-
volving a set of assumptions about the motion and collision of an aggregate of gas
molecules; hence, it constitutes a representational analog of the theory. From both
an historical and practical perspective, the importance of analogical models in the
practice of science cannot be overstated.
In the mid-1960's Mary Hesse advanced seminal work on analogical models by
characterizing them as standing in a three-place relation involving a model M of a
target system X that is relative to a physical system Y. Here, Y is understood as the
source of a set of assumptions—sometimes called 'modeling assumptions'—on the
basis of which the behaviour of X is to be investigated. If, for example, a modeler's
target system is
medium in which light waves are propagated
the assumptions underlying Y will be, among other things, the associated physi-
cal laws governing optics. Hesse12 characterized the relation between Y and X as
involving,
1. some positive analogies, i.e. properties, or relations between properties, that
both Y and X share;
11This claim was supported by Stephan Hartmann during his presentation ''Unification and Co-
herence'' at the Philosophy of Science Association Biennial Meeting at Vancouver, BC, 2006.
12The alphabetized points are lifted verbatim from Psillos (1999): 141, who paraphrases from
Hesse (1966): 8-9.
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2. negative analogies, i.e. properties, or relations between properties, in respect
of which X is unlike Y; and
3. some neutral analogies, i.e. some properties about which we do not yet know
whether they are positive analogies, and which may turn out either positive
analogies or negative ones.
The positive and neutral analogies between Y and X provide the conditions
whereby a model of X might be constructed relative to a background of Y. The
point of analogical models is to highlight the heuristic role played by Y in revealing
important properties of a specified physical system X.
More recently, Ronald Giere (1988: 81) has developed and reformulated Hesse's
analysis of the scientific model-building process in the following way. A model M
of target system X based on source system Y represents X in the respects specified
by the positive analogies between X and Y. In addition, the representational quality
is graded in degrees that are specified by the conditions of approximation and the
idealizations employed by the model. On this view, the assumptions that underlie
Y—i.e. the so-called 'laws of nature'—are understood only as principles that guide
the process of model-building.
Such a deflationary view of scientific laws stands in contrast to that of the re-
ceived view of theories, where laws of nature are construed as universal laws meant
to describe the actual behaviour of a designated class of real objects. Recall that un-
der Carnap-Ramsey laws are expressed as nonlogical axioms that provide theories
with most of their empirical content (or, from the antirealist's perspective, their in-
strumental value). But according to Giere, the Carnap-Ramsey view of laws as
having empirical content is problematic given the degree of idealization13 imple-
mented in their statement—that is, either the intended class of objects described
in the laws must be empty (in which case the laws apply to no real objects), or the
assumed laws are just false. So, on the Gierean approach the question of a the-
ory's truth is recast and expressed in terms of the respects in which the theoretical
model and the real system are similar, and to what degree. Given the Geirean view
13Idealization here is meant to suggest that there are no 'real-world' systems answering to such
laws. In expressing natural laws scientists assume theoretical models in which, for example, the en-
ergy of a moving body is held constant. This, of course, implies an absence of friction in the system.
Scientists have to idealize as such for pragmatic purposes, since oppositional forces like friction are
too complex to be captured by any even moderately complex formulae. So, whereas physical laws
make explicit reference to things like Euclidean two-dimensional axes, perfect spheres, frictionless
three-dimensional planes, resistance-free pendulums and the like, the class of such entities is nev-
ertheless understood and assumed by proponents of this view to be empty, and the attendant laws
are held to be, strictly speaking, vacuous.
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of scientific theories, the question of realism is recast as one about the level of rep-
resentative accuracy surrounding a family of models that are the theory, rather than
over the truth of sentences or statements and how they correspond to the world.
The preceding discussion of analogical models is meant to highlight the impor-
tant distinction between the sense of 'model' employed in a Hesse/Giere 'model-
based understanding of theories', and the altogether different model-theoretic or
'semantic' view of theories. The sense of 'model' in the latter derives from the
branch of mathematical logic known as formal semantics, or model theory. Model
theory involves the interpretation of formal languages using set-theoretic struc-
tures and Tarskian 'T sentences' as a schema for truth. To a certain extent, the
model-theoretic approach in the philosophy of science is motivated by the success
mathematicians have had using model theory to clarify formerly obscure issues in
both logic and mathematics, such as those surrounding the relationship between
proof and truth. Patrick Suppes pioneered the model-theoretic approach to scien-
tific theories in the late 1950's and developed it through the 1960's. On Suppes'
account, a theory abstracts from a particular linguistic representation and focuses
instead on what it is that makes the theory true.
The semantic view identifies theories with classes of model--types, where a
theory is a class of fully articulated mathematical structure--types that are defined
by the use of set--theoretical predicates (Suppes, 1967; da Costa and French 1990).
Alternatively, theories might be defined by the use of the mathematical language
that is dictated by the subject matter of the particular theory (van Fraassen 1980;
Suppe 1989). The idea, in the former case, is to use the full apparatus of set-theory
to specify the object, property and relation extensions of their linguistic counter-
parts in order to define the theory's terms. Hence, a theory satisfies some model
once an effective mapping of the theory's vocabulary is linked to a set-theoretic
representation of the target system's domain, with objects, properties and relations
in a one-one correspondence via functions assigning subsets of objects to one-place
predicates, two-place relations, and so on—such is the model's interpretation.
Standard interpretations are fixed via constraints on theories. Theoretical con-
straints are sets of sentences with fixed truth-values that stipulate the terms in
question. They are usually expressed as the axioms or laws governing a particular
theory, and they function as a central and explicit part of the theory. Operational
constraints, on the other hand, function in the role of assertability, or experiential,
conditions on empirical sentences; that is to say, they tell us what can be mea-
sured and observed. The idea is that empirical sentences have built-in test condi-
tions that are not stipulated in order to provide the meanings of those sentences,
yet the nature of those test-conditions constrain our judgment about when those
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sentences are true. Our implicit understanding of these conditions constitute the
pre-analytic and pragmatic background assumptions giving rise to a class of in-
tended models, or intended interpretations, for theories. Operational constraints
are not internal to, or part of, a scientific theory, but they function as necessary
preconditions for a theory's creation and expression.
The preceding discussion of constraints should help to illuminate some of the
difficulties faced by proponents of the set-theoretic version of the semantic view
of theories—in particular, those who want it to bolster the case for metaphysical
realism. Proponents of the view take an abstract set-theoretic representation as
isomorphic with a theory, and the theory's truth is satisfied by such an intended
model. However, if term-extensions are taken to be isomorphic with a set-theoretic
structure, and if a theory's interpretation (intended or otherwise) is not an explicit
part of the theory, the given structure is susceptible to Newman's complaint. Recall
that Newman showed any such structure to be ad hoc without some explicit appeal
to an empirical ground for choosing a specific structure.
Upon recognizing the failings of the foregoing account, Bas van Fraassen ad-
vanced, in the 1970's and 80's, an influential variation on the semantic view which
abandons appeal to set-theory as a representative medium. Van Fraassen (1980;
1989) recognizes that an abstract, set-theoretic representation will not do;14 one
must instead be able to identify and specify examples of the theory as realized by
the world. Sets, after all, should be ontologically suspect for any empiricist. So,
van Fraassen's novel turn is the notion that the world models a theory, which af-
firms the classical view that theories are, to an important degree, 'read off' the
world. Assuming such a view, Jupiter and its moons might constitute a model
satisfying Newton's laws of motion plus the theory of universal gravitation.
The shift in emphasis to what actually satisfies, or models, the axioms of a the-
ory constitutes a marked departure from both the set-theoretic and syntactic views,
the latter of which emphasizes the axioms, their logical form, and what might be
deduced from them. Recall that on the syntactic view one must first reconstruct
the axioms of a theory into some appropriate formal language (introducing the rel-
evant quantifiers and logical constants, etc.) and follow by introducing correspon-
dence rules. In contrast, van Fraassen's semantic approach downplays concerns
over the language in which the theory is stated. Any comprehensible language
14Van Fraassen implements a state space representation—a technique developed by physicists in
the nineteenth century—as a formal alternative by which to express particular scientific theories.
Since the details of the specific technique are immaterial to the philosophical points I mean to
emphasize, a discussion of state space representation can be avoided here. Readers can refer to
van Fraassen (1980: ch. 6) for a thorough discussion of state/phase spaces.
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capable of making reliable distinctions between the objects satisfying the theory's
axioms and those that do not will suffice. Hence, van Fraassen shifts the empha-
sis from the axioms—understood as linguistic entities—to the models, which are
nonlinguistic, physical entities.
The semantic view of theories involves the implicit assumption,
Θ ⇐∆ Θ is true ⇐∆ Θ has a class of intended models,15
which means that a theory is true, where truth is understood as relative to some
class of intended models. Stated somewhat differently, the semantic view identifies
a theory with a class of intended models (◊ = m1...n≠1), and the theory's truth hinges
on the world being one of the class of intended models; which is to say, the theory
just is the set of intended models.
1.6 Realism, Truth and the Semantic View of Theories
Recall from an earlier discussion that metaphysical, or orthodox, realism is cap-
tured in two central theses:
1. Sentences+ about  particular  entities, certain  classes  of  entities, or  some
subject  matter  have  (on  suitable  occasions)  truth  conditions  which  are
mind/language-independent; and,
2. Some of the sentences+ about those entities or subject matter actually are true,
and they are true independent of whether human beings, or any other know-
ers, take them to be so.
In an earlier discussion I rejected the part of thesis 2 which states that certain
sentences+ are true independent of whether knowers take them to be so. The
very notion of a truth condition for a sentence+, I suggested, implies grasping
some minimally appropriate knowledge-condition for its warranted assertion or
belief. The notion of truth, on this view, is inescapably tied to both knowledge and
language. Given the preceding conception, truth is a property of sentences+ only
relative to some linguistic/epistemic community.
In the mid-twentieth century, Polish logician Alfred Tarski offered a defini-
tion of truth for formal languages that is, by most accounts, still considered the
paradigm. Philosophers quickly co-opted the Tarskian model and applied it to
15Demopoulos (2003): 391.
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natural languages as a means of, among other things, expressing the conditions
of truth for both everyday sentences and scientific propositions. When such sen-
tences are recast under the Tarskian model they are known as 'T-sentences'. For
example:
''The atomic mass of Barium is 137.327 amu'' is true iff the atomic mass of Barium
is 137.327amu.
The 'object language' portion of the T-sentence in quotations—left of the locution,
'is true iff'—stands in the relation of material equivalence to its 'meta-language'
disquotation to the biconditional's right. But all the Tarskian algorithm (''P'' is
true iff P) tells us is that if it is legitimate to assert P, it is also legitimate to assert
that ''P'' is true. So, if the Tarskian model is acceptable as a paradigm definition
for truth—which the semantic view assumes—then it bolsters the view that the
disquotation of a T-sentence merits substantial justificatory unpacking. Indeed, I
assume this to be the case.
The question I intend to explore for the remainder of this section is the extent to
which the semantic view of theories works to facilitate realism of theory. Specifi-
cally, I consider van Fraassen's constructive empiricist reformulation of the semantic
view, since structural accounts—like both Russell's and the set-theoretic version of
the semantic view—are susceptible to Newman's objection. Ramsey-Carnap, on
the other hand, fails to support a robust realism by eliminating overt reference to
a theory's theoretical vocabulary.
Van Fraassen (1980; 1989) uses empirical adequacy as an epistemic surrogate
for truth of theory. That is, to the extent that the observable consequences of a
given theory come out true, the theory should be considered empirically adequate.
Constructive empiricists challenge both the existential and epistemic status of the-
oretical assertions; they doubt that one can ever be in a position to justifiably hold
that the truth-conditions for certain theoretical assertions in fact obtain. Hence,
constructive empiricists hold that the rational stance with respect to the truth of
assertions involving reference to theoretical/unobservable entities is suspension
of judgement, or agnosticism. Contrast this with the scientific realist, who stresses
that there is ample warrant—at least in some instances—to believe that certain
scientific theories have achieved a significant degree of theoretical truth. Alterna-
tively, constructive empiricism motivates a picture of scientific practice where one
need not be concerned over the issue of whether a theory gets its substructures
right. Instead, the picture of scientific inquiry is one where the task of establishing
the truth of certain theoretical assertions does not even feature among its ambi-
tions. That is to say, van Fraassen offers an alternative philosophical view of sci-
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ence: mature scientific theories are both successful and meaningful, but scientists
neither aspire to, nor do they deliver theoretical truth by them—science aims only
at achieving theories that are empirically adequate.
On van Fraassen's version of the semantic view of theories the distinction be-
tween what is and is not observable is not drawn on the basis of vocabulary (as
with Carnap-Ramsey). Instead, the distinction is determined via the demarcation
of empirical substructures.
To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models; and secondly,
to specify certain parts of those models (the empirical substructures) as candidates
for the direct representation of observable phenomena. The structures which can
be described in experimental and measurement reports we can call appearances;
the theory is empirically adequate if it has some model such that all appearances
are isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model. (van Fraassen: 1980, 64)
However, constructive empiricism shares with Ramsey-Carnap the view that
to assert  a theory as true is  to say that there is, in fact, a model which real-
izes the theory. Recall that Ramsey-Carnap does so via an explicit—albeit non-
specific—statement that the theory is realized by the world; van Fraassen does so
by specifying the empirical parts of models as candidates for isomorphic ''direct
representation'' by observers. We can therefore think of van Fraassen as a realist
with respect to the unambiguously empirical parts of a theory, yet an anti-realist
with respect to the sentences of a theory which make reference to posits that are in
principle unobservable.
Earlier I indicated that the thrust of this section would be to investigate the de-
gree to which the semantic view supports metaphysical realism. Under the con-
structive empiricist framework, a successful theory featuring substructures whose
models cannot be described in experimental and measurement reports cannot be
held as true. But since such substructures are, in principle, precluded from 'iso-
morphic direct representation', scientific realists view van Fraassen's criterion as
austere. The unappealing result of such a rigid criterion is that a surfeit of estab-
lished scientific theories must be taken as instrumental. Scientific realists reject
the instrumentalist construal of mature theories because they take the unobserv-
able/theoretical posits featuring in them as existentially quantified on account of
reliable evidence. Moreover, scientific realists usually take a scientific commu-
nity to be (in its corresponding sphere of investigation) the rightful arbiter of the
conditions under which some posit might be justifiably granted existence. Hence,
scientific realists reject constructive empiricism's canonical doctrine that it is al-
ways more rational to regard a mature theory as empirically adequate rather than
true. In other words, they allege that constructive empiricists distort the intuitive
Reference and Reinterpretation 22
and conventional sense by which we attach ascriptions of truth to our theoretical
claims.
Recall that a central motivation for scientific realism is Putnam's ''no miracles
argument'' (1975: 73): it would be miraculous if our best scientific theories were
not at least approximately true given their tremendous overall success. The argu-
ment captures a reasonable intuition but does little more than offer an abductive
basis upon which to investigate the ways in which theoretical terms might actually
refer, should we conclude, following Richard Boyd (1983, 1985), that a true theory's
posits must do so. Van Fraassen, however, rejects the no miracles argument, de-
spite its commonsensical force, because he rejects abduction16 as a legitimate mode
of inference.
The view that a theory's terms must determinately refer in order to uphold sci-
entific realism has also been contested. The Gierean theory of scientific theories
adopts a so-called realist attitude toward science while at once rejecting the no-
tion that theories ought to be construed linguistically. His 'model-based' approach
grades models—qua representations—in terms of similarity to their specific target
systems, where the degrees of similarity are specified by conditions of approxima-
tion and the degree of idealization employed by the model. The relations between
models and their targets are expressed in hypotheses that affirm, in phenome-
nal/cognitive terms, the relevant respects and degrees in which they are similar.
The project can therefore be seen as an augmentation of Karl Popper's failed at-
tempt to explicate theories in terms of verisimilitude, or truthlikeness, while still
maintaining a realist attitude toward science.
Despite its billing, Giere's 'constructive realism' cannot be called a realist view
if realism is understood in the traditional sense—that is, as involving a correspon-
dence relation between what sentences+ say and certain conditions of the world.
Giere rejects the notion that theories should be understood as truth-conditioned
linguistic descriptions of their target systems, and he rejects the notion that the-
oretical posits must have determinable referents to uphold realism (Giere: 1999,
177). However, Chakravartty (2001) has observed that even constructive realism
cannot—in its attempt to shift emphasis from correspondence between sentences
and the world to similarity between features of models and their targets—avoid a
retreat to sentences+ in the specification of similarities held to obtain. Moreover,
16Van Fraassen rejects abduction because he takes explanations to be interest driven; hence, a
theory may be explanatory with respect to one set of aims but not with respect to another. For
van Fraassen there is no independent perspective from which a theory might be pronounced ex-
planatorily successful, since an explanation requires a context to fix interests and purposes. Only
pragmatic considerations determine what will qualify as explanatory.
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Giere argues that such 'auxiliary hypotheses' are precisely what give a theory its
empirical content. Whereas, on the one hand, Giere is able to avoid Newman's
criticism, on the other he and his supporters require an account of how auxiliary
hypotheses (construed as sentences+) can give rise to any degree of significance
whatsoever.
Indeed, there is a sense in which Giere is equivocal about 'realism', but a char-
itable reading suggests that he is in fact attempting to extend the 'goalposts' and
perhaps redefine realism. While I am sympathetic to such a proposal—especially
given the seemingly intractable task of explicating how sentences+ might be held
true and correspondent with conditions of the world in some way independent
of knowers—engaging such a discussion will, at this stage, lead matters too far
afield.
Given the preceding survey, it should be apparent that no version of the seman-
tic view of theories works to facilitate metaphysical realism solely in virtue of its
framework of expression. That is, the varying frameworks within which theories
are expressed fail to show how truth conditions might be credited to sentences+ in
some manner independent of human judgment. In each case, the referential func-
tions that compose a theory's intended interpretation are fixed via our pre-analytic
intuitions about what kinds of things exist and how to ascribe truth to both our ob-
servable and theoretical domains; moreover, those intuitions are just assumed to
be correct. Van Fraassen's variation on the semantic view manages to avoid some
of the ontological challenges faced by both the received view and the set-theoretic
approach, but under constructive empiricism we cannot countenance even some
of our best theories as true.
In the next chapter I investigate a strategy in a family of arguments advanced
by Hilary Putnam known as the 'model-theoretic argument against metaphysical
realism'. Putnam shows that upon interpreting the theoretical vocabulary of a the-
ory reconstructed in the Ramsey-Carnap, format, the theory—despite its now pro-
viding a, so-called, 'realist' referential scheme for a theoretical vocabulary—will
still be susceptible to systematic reinterpretation along the lines Newman laid out
in his objection to Russell. Moreover, Putnam attempts to show that no proposed
naturalistic constraint can work to solve the Newman problem, since the proposed
constraint will always be a candidate for reinterpretation given its membership in
the global theoretical domain. My undertaking in the latter portion of the next
chapter will be to show why Putnam's 'just more theory' argument fails.
Chapter 2
''It's all the same, only the names will change.''—Bon Jovi
2.1 Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument
Putnam's  notorious  model-theoretic  argument  against  metaphysical  realism
(henceforth, MTA) is the meta-logical counterpart to Newman's criticism of Rus-
sell. Demopoulos-Friedman (1985: 194) observes that, ''Where Putnam argues
from the consistency of a set of sentences, Newman argues directly from the exis-
tence of a relational structure satisfying the intuitive conditions of a model.'' The
MTA is meant to set the stage for Putnam's Kantianesque 'internal realism', a sys-
tem where words and thoughts cannot, even in principle, reach out to the external
world.
Putnam views metaphysical realism as a constellation of several closely asso-
ciated philosophical theses about the relations between language and reality, and
between truth, knowledge and warranted belief. His depiction of metaphysical
realism is captured here:
On  this  perspective, the  world  consists  of  some  fixed  totality  of  mind-
independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of 'the
way the world is'. Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between
words or thought-signs [what I've been calling, 'sentences+.'] and external things
and sets of things. (1981: 49)
Putnam holds that the impressive success of science certainly warrants the view
that our best theories cannot be grossly off-the-mark, but this in no way entails the
foregoing version of metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realists hold that some
sentences in our best theories are true and that their sub-sentential elements cor-
respond with worldly objects, which is to say metaphysical realists believe that
the sub-sentential terms of those true sentences determinately refer. If this is so,
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according to Putnam, the onus is on the metaphysical realist to demonstrate how
this might be so, and he attempts to show, via the MTA, that the realist cannot de-
liver on this requirement. As background for the argument Putnam appeals to an
important proof of meta-logic—the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem—which merits
some discussion.
When Leopold Löwenheim developed his theorem in the early twentieth cen-
tury it seemed plausible to some mathematicians that mathematical objects, like
sets, could be characterized via postulated axioms. The axioms could define the
class of intended mathematical objects and would be expressed in what was, at the
time, the only well-understood branch of logic: the first-order predicate calculus.
At this time Georg Cantor had already proven several famous results, including
the theorem which states that the set of all subsets (i.e. the power set) of a given
set must be cardinally greater than that set. His proof implies there are infinities
of different size, or cardinality. Since it is also possible to show that the cardinality
of the set of real numbers is equal to the cardinality of the power set of the natu-
ral numbers, it follows that the set of all real numbers (i.e. all numbers expressed
as following a decimal point) is larger than the set of natural numbers. Löwen-
heim, and later Thoraf Skolem, used Cantor's result to prove another theorem that
seemed, at the time, rather paradoxical.
In  Skolem's  strengthened version, the  'downward'  portion of  the  theorem
shows that for countable, or finite, sets of sentences of standard first-order predi-
cate logic, if there is any model with an infinite domain in which those sentences
are true, there is another model in which they are true where the domain of the
second model is a subset of the domain of the first model, and the new domain
can be mapped one-one onto a set of natural numbers. Moreover, the new model
is a 'submodel' of the original—that is, all the terms of the language have the same
referent in both models, and for any n-place formula in the language and n-tuple
of elements of the submodel, the n-tuple satisfies the formula in one model just in-
case it does so in the other. For example, take a theory T in which S denotes the set
of all subsets of the set of natural numbers under interpretation I1. S1's cardinality
is therefore larger than that of the set of natural numbers. The Löwenheim-Skolem
theorem shows that the true sentences of T can be reinterpreted under I2 such that
I1 and I2 might say different things about S, yet the sentences of T come out true
under both interpretations. Such reinterpretations are sometimes called 'proxy
functions' and a systematic application of proxy functions is sometimes called a
'permutation'. Putnam takes the proof to apply to any domain of individuals—in
particular, those held to exist by metaphysical realists—and claims to achieve the
same paradoxical result.
Reference and Reinterpretation 26
The generalized model-theoretic version of the argument1 asks that we con-
sider a theory T construed in the Carnapian vein (i.e. descriptivist, partially in-
terpreted and expressed in first-order logic). We should assume that T is an ideal
theory; it is therefore:
…complete, consistent, and it predicts correctly (as far as we can tell)
all observation sentences to meet whatever ''operational constraints''
there are [such that it is]…''beautiful'', ''simple'', ''plausible'', etc. The
supposition under consideration is that [T] might be all this and still be
(in reality) false.2
Since its observational consequences come out true we should extend the inter-
pretation of T to its theoretical vocabulary L. We do so by assuming that the world,
W, can be parsed into infinitely many pieces and have T claim there are infinitely
many things. Ex hypothesi, T is consistent, so by the 'upward' Löwenheim-Skolem
theorem3 (which states that a model whose submodel is infinite has elementary
extensions of arbitrarily large cardinality) T has a model of every infinite cardi-
nality—that is, the sentences of T can be true under a different, albeit elementary
equivalent, model. Chose such a model, M, of the same cardinality as W, and se-
lect a map of the individuals of M onto W that is in one-one correspondence. We
can then use the mapping to define the relations of M directly in W. This gives us
a satisfaction relation SAT that we can use to define—in Tarskian fashion—a truth
predicate for T: TRUE(SAT). The SAT relation is a function mapping the terms of
L onto sets of pieces of the world, so the 'correspondence' relation between terms
and the world assures that T comes out true of W, which means any consistent the-
ory is true 'of the world.' However—and this is the kicker—T is true of the world
only to the extent that we interpret 'true' as TRUE(SAT).
The problem, as Putnam sees it (and as Newman analogously saw it), is that
TRUE(SAT) gives us an entirely ad hoc extension that trivializes the truth of T. The
triviality is a direct result of T's inability to reject any model meeting SAT, which
is to say T commits us to the implication that T is true, but only if T is TRUE(SAT).
Here we can see how the result mirrors Newman's concern: T is TRUE(SAT) is
true as a matter of logic, not as a matter of empirical fact. TRUE(SAT) fails to dis-
tinguish between the intended model, with empirical content, and non-standard,
albeit elementary equivalent, models. So the MTA and Newman's objection dif-
fer only to the extent that Newman shows that fixing the domain and models up
1I will focus primarily on the MTA as presented in Putnam (1981).
2Putnam (1976), 485.
3The upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is a consequence of the compactness theorem, which
states that a theory T has a model if each of its finite subsets has a model.
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to isomorphism does not fix the intended reference of the T- vocabulary4, whereas
Putnam shows that fixing the domain and models up to elementary equivalence does
not fix the intended reference of the T-vocabulary. Apart from this disparity, the
only relevant difference between them lies in the specific purposes for which each
theorist deploys his version of the strategy.
Putnam is able to generalize the first-order result—that any consistent theory
can be interpreted in such a way as to make all its sentences true—by observing
that all one needs to do so is to assume that there are enough things in the world.
This, of course, renders his elaborate model-theoretic exposition of the argument
superfluous. Nevertheless, according to Putnam, anyone who claims to be assert-
ing the 'capital-T' truth of a particular theory about a theoretical domain accepts
more than the fact that it is true according to some intended interpretation. The ar-
gument, in effect, challenges the realist assumption that metaphysical constraints
provide a unique true interpretation, since a wealth of true interpretations obtain.
Putnam then generates examples which he takes to show this (1978: 123-7; 1981:
29-48; 1983b: ix-xii, 1-25; 1989: 213-21). His results affirm that, given any domain
of objects and an attendant theoretical or natural language L to use in reference,
the designated extensions for the predicates of L can be permuted consistently
without altering the truth value assigned to each sentence at each possible world.
Such permutations are taken to show that any referential scheme we can give for a
language is open to systematic reinterpretation, since each consistent permutation
delivers the same truth-valued result at the level of sentences.
Putnam often prefaces his presentation of permutation arguments with a care-
ful discussion of operational and theoretical constraints on reference. Recall from
I.§5. that theoretical constraints are sets of sentences with fixed truth-values; they
consist of the axioms that stipulate the meanings of the terms in question. Oper-
ational constraints, on the other hand, function in the role of experiential condi-
tions on empirical sentences that tell us what can be measured and observed. Such
empirical conditions are not stipulated in order to provide the meanings of those
sentences (i.e. the conditions are considered pre-theoretic and intuitive), but the
nature of those conditions are held to constrain our judgment about when empir-
ical sentences are true. Therefore, in order to evade charges that his permutations
are mere formal operations having no application to the concrete world, Putnam
specifies that all theoretical and operational constraints on the reference of a lan-
guage must be held constant.
The important conclusion Putnam intends to convey by way of his permuta-
tion examples is this: keeping theoretical and operational constraints invariant,
4Demopoulos-Friedman (1985), 194.
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if the reference of sub-sentential terms may be varied in a systematic way with-
out a shift in the truth values of entire sentences, then the putative truth condi-
tions prescribed by W can neither determine the truth of sentences+, nor can they
determine the reference of sub-sentential elements. As a corollary, metaphysical
realism is shown to be false because the permuted worlds confound, according
to Putnam, at least two of the metaphysical realist's core theses. First, and most
explicitly, they are counterexamples to the claim that there can be one uniquely
true theory/ description of the world. Second, they show that since truth can be
made to obtain for sentences in a theory whose interpretation is radically nonstan-
dard, the notion of a correspondence relation between what sentences+ say and
the world is horribly obscured.
Permutations enable us to construct possible worlds in which, for example, the
term ''cat'' might refer to dogs (or virtually anything else), while the truth values of
the atomic sentences—hence, of all sentences—in those permuted worlds remain
equivalent to those of our own. However, in each permuted world the specific re-
lation between a given term and its world-indexed referent differs in some salient
way. Cats and dogs, for example, are genetically distinct in ways that biological
science has uncovered, but even without a genetic description we intuit that the
animals are somehow distinct. So, if ''cat'' refers to cats in W, but in W* ''cat'' refers
to dogs, it should be obvious that the referential relation between the term ''cat''
and its corresponding extension—the set of all ''cats''—in each world differs signif-
icantly. That is to say, the truth conditions for a sentence containing ''cat'' in each
of these worlds will be different. For example, the conditions in W that satisfy the
sentence ''the cat is on the mat'' are different from those that satisfy the same sen-
tence in W*, since in W ''cat'' refers to the set of all cats, and in W* ''cat'' refers to,
say, the set of all dogs. Yet those disparate conditions are—at the same time—truth
conditions for the same sentence, only indexed to different worlds. Recall that for
Putnam's metaphysical realist, truth is fixed through a unique correspondence be-
tween what sentences+ say and the way the world is. However, if systematic
permutations of our referential scheme can produce sentences+ whose truth val-
ues are invariant across worlds, yet whose truth conditions vary from world to
world with each instance of the same sentence+, the notion of correspondence is
indeed obscured. Unless correspondence between a sentence+ and the world is
relativised to a specific interpretation for that world, 'correspondence' holds of the
relation between ''the cat is on the mat'' and every set of truth conditions (i.e. from
each permuted world) that satisfy the sentence. Putnam takes this true-relative-to-
a-referential-scheme result to confute the unique correspondence claim that is, ac-
cording to Putnam, crucial for metaphysical realism.
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In the following section I address some popular criticisms of the MTA by draw-
ing them in general form. By doing so I hope, at the outset, to set aside some
general misconceptions that have surfaced as putative grounds for the MTA's dis-
missal. I will show that these criticisms either miss its point, or apply only to
certain expositions of the argument.
2.2 Putnam's Paradox
Putnam's MTA has struck many as counterintuitive and others as out-and-out
paradoxical; hence, one well-worn critical strategy has been to attack it via reduc-
tio ad absurdum. Proponents of this strategy (e.g. Glymour: 1982; Lewis: 1984)
reply to Putnam with a dilemma along these lines: (1) If we cannot pick-out the
elements of the world, W, we cannot define, describe, or identify any function that
assigns extensions to our terms and predicates in descriptions of W. (2) If, on the
other hand, we can pick-out the elements of W, then we can distinguish between
right and wrong assignments of extensions to our predicates in W. Proponents of
this strategy usually assume Putnam to be offering the MTA as a counterexample
to the antecedent of the conditional premise (2), thus affirming the truth of the an-
tecedent in (1), which one can agree lands us squarely in contradiction. Those same
critics take as self-evident the view that we are indeed capable of distinguishing
between right and wrong assignments of extensions to our predicates in W, hence
the antecedent of (2) must obtain, which shows that the MTA cannot apply to our
language.
To restate somewhat less technically: it is clear we are capable of grasping
the distinction between our intended interpretive scheme and non-standard (per-
muted) reinterpretations. This is why it strikes any competent English speaker as
odd when someone attempts to use the term ''bicycle'' in reference to a jigsaw puz-
zle (or anything other than a bicycle, for that matter). The ability to distinguish our
standard, intended interpretation from non-standard ones provides us the where-
withal for determining reference. That is to say, since we know which one among
the scores of possible permutations is the intended interpretation, determining ref-
erence is merely a matter of stipulating that our standard interpretation is the cor-
rect one—namely, the one that squares with the way we actually use language.
However, if we were incapable of making such an important distinction, it would
be impossible for us to learn a language in the first place, let alone follow the rea-
soning in Putnam's argument. Hence, the MTA cannot possibly apply to our own
language.
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There is indeed something appealing about this argument. But this otherwise
acceptable line of reasoning misconstrues the intended target of Putnam's den-
igration. Recall that Putnam takes the truth conditions for sentences to under-
determine the reference of their sub-sentential elements, and he supports this by
showing how certain reinterpretations of those sentences leave truth-values in-
variant. Certainly Putnam relies on our ability to refer successfully—that is, to
distinguish between right and wrong assignments of extensions to our predicates
in the act of linguistic communication. So we can rightfully charge Putnam with
question-begging if his aim is to indiscriminately undermine our ability to success-
fully refer; after all, he clearly presupposes a referential scheme by the very act of
assuming his argument to have content. The important point to note, however,
is that Putnam is not offering a skeptical thesis about our ability to refer success-
fully—what David Lewis (1983: 226) has called ''a purely voluntaristic view of
reference''. Rather, Putnam means to dismantle a specific brand of metaphysi-
cal realism and its en suite theory of truth (as outlined early in §1). Hence, if the
alternative Putnam advances (i.e. his internal realism) doesn't succumb to the crit-
icisms he levels against the metaphysical realist (which I do not believe it does), it
should be acceptable for him, at the very least, to assume some referential scheme
in order to state the argument.
Another notable line of argument surfacing in the literature contra the MTA
(e.g., Hacking: 1983, 105) takes aim at its first-order exposition sketched in Put-
nam's 'Models and Reality' (1977). The criticism, roughly put, is that, given the ar-
gument's first-order exposition, and given the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem's lim-
ited applicability to first-order languages, the MTA can only apply to first-order
languages. Hacking explains:
The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is about sentences in first-order logic.
No one has ever shown that the commonplace language of physicists
can ever be squeezed into a first-order format. So the argument is not
known to be relevant to, say, quantum electrodynamics, and hence, not
to scientific realism (1983: 105).
Strictly speaking, Hacking's criticism holds of the exposition against which he
levels the charge, but the criticism must be restricted only to such first-order ex-
positions. In other versions, however, concerns over its limited, first-order scope
do not apply. For example, in Reason, Truth and History (Putnam, 1981) he asks
that we consider permutations of a language whose reinterpretations preserve the
truth conditions of the language's atomic sentences—that is, its propositional matri-
ces. It should be clear to Hacking that the latter version (Putnam (1981)) preserves
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the truth values of second-order generalizations (and also their modalizations5).
So, whereas it seems likely that quantum electrodynamics will never be captured
in first order logic, that the MTA doesn't apply to scientific realism does not fol-
low. If, for example, certain legitimate physical theories actually are expressible at
second-order (or higher), then the MTA—assuming for the moment that it actually
can apply to scientific theories so expressed—would certainly pose a problem for
scientific realism. If not already obvious, I will (ensuingly) argue that the MTA
cannot apply to such theories.
In the next section I examine arguments by other authors who follow a strategy
similar to that of Putnam. Their general approach is motivated by related, albeit
distinct, worries regarding the determinacy of reference for terms in a given theory.
My reasons for highlighting these other arguments are three. First, they clarify the
gist of Putnam's strategy less technically; second, they share some assumptions
about reference being, to varying degrees, independent and unconstrained; and
thirdly, they falter for making the same error as Putnam.
2.3 Putnam and the Permuationists
2.3.1 Quine
In  W.V.  Quine's  'Ontological  Relativity'  he  raises  proxy  functions  in  a  non-
mathematical context by rehearsing the ''gavagai'' thought experiment from his
Word and Object (1960). To briefly recap: A rabbit scampers by and a native points
and utters the word ''gavagai''. Assuming the role of field linguists, we face the
problem of choosing a function that links the term to its referent. According to
Quine, we cannot settle the matter by repeatedly querying the expression 'gavagai'
for the native's assent or dissent while systematically varying stimulus conditions
because, ''…a whole rabbit is present when and only when an undetached part of a
rabbit is present, also when and only when a temporal stage of a rabbit is present''
(1969c: 30). Hence, we can never be certain whether, by 'gavagai', the native refers
to the rabbit as, say, a type of species (like we tend to do in our conventional ref-
erential practice), or whether the native means to suggest, for example, more nu-
anced ideas like, ''undetached rabbit-parts'', ''temporal rabbit stage'', etc. Accord-
ing to Quine, translators will charitably assume that the native refers to the rabbit
in the same manner we do, and therefore assign the 'Junglese' term ''gavagai'' as
coextensive with ''rabbit''. However, we are just as warranted assigning ''gavagai''
5Hale and Wright (1997) p. 433.
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as coextensive with ''temporal rabbit stage'' or ''undetached rabbit-parts''; hence,
both meaning and reference are indeterminate.
Quine is, in fact, chiefly concerned with the indeterminacy of meaning/ in-
scrutability of reference with respect to members of a common linguistic commu-
nity. He uses the example of radical translation to pump our intuitions that the dis-
parate scenarios are indeed analogous. In spite of the obvious fact that we manage
to use our languages successfully, Quine instead emphasizes the hazy individ-
uation conditions for objects in our domain of ontological discourse. However,
our ability to use language with great success—scientific language, in particu-
lar—should provide ample warrant for the view that the individuation conditions
stipulated in our best scientific theories are, by and large, quite good, notwith-
standing their defeasibility. Moreover, if human referential practices are in princi-
ple inscrutable, yet inscrutability is a matter of degree (which Quine would indeed
permit), inscrutability ought then be conceived on a continuum, with, for example,
radical, natural language translation at one extreme, and, say, theoretical physics
at the other.
We can concede some amount of indeterminacy to Quine because the proxy
functions in his own examples are (somewhat) plausible and offer salient alter-
natives. That is to say, the utterance ''gavagai'' is indeterminate with respect to
'rabbit', 'rabbit-stages/parts', etc. but not so of, say, 'Bradley tank' or 'moon of
Jupiter'—we rule out such peculiar alternatives because they are, quite simply, too
outlandish. For reasons related to contextual saliency we do not consider them le-
gitimate referential candidates under any feasibly coherent scheme. Saliency and
other use-related contextual considerations function as constraints on our inter-
pretations of utterances; they limit referential inscrutability to the extent that most
cases of indeterminacy are soluble and we ultimately achieve a successful trans-
lation. Moreover, most of us recognize that more exists than need be existentially
quantified in our theories. As Field (1982) is apt to note, ''it is rarely to the point to
assert the existence of undetached rabbit parts as well as of rabbits.'' Evidently, a
little common sense goes a long way in radical translation.
When Quine discusses proxy functions he has in mind the notion of a ''cosmic
complement'', where predicates that apply to concrete objects can be reinterpreted
to reflect different objects that might be assigned as the values of a theory's quan-
tified variables. According to Quine, there is no way to resolve which function
provides the genuine article. So, despite our ability to make reliable predictions
under a given referential scheme, it is presumptuous to assume there is a uniquely
correct referent.
However, when Quine observes that it is possible to permute the entire set-
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theoretic universe by exchanging the referential roles played by sets and their cos-
mic complements without altering anything in our linguistic practice, he ignores
the point that Newman stressed: there is indeed an empirical basis for the theoret-
ical structures appearing in our best theories. So, whereas we can permit count-
less permutations of the abstract set-theoretic universe—where reference between
mere terms and abstracta (like sets) is, by definition, unfettered—we cannot per-
mit the same of cosmic complements if there are, in fact, naturalistic constraints
that steer our practice of referring to them. Quine (1981) eschews such constraints
by permitting radical proxy functions in support of ontological relativity. But the
move puzzling in light of Quine's view that the difference between abstract math-
ematical objects and concrete objects is illusory—that is, there are, as a matter of
empirical fact, only concrete objects. Hence, Quine would need to claim that a
naturalistic constraint—e.g. causality—plays no role whatsoever in fixing the ref-
erential relations between the terms of sentences+ and their cosmic complements.
But this is clearly not his view.
Quine, in fact, acknowledges the existence of causal constraints on reference as,
for example, ''…one's own inborn propensity to find one stimulation qualitatively
more akin to a second stimulation than to a third'' (1969c: 31). But on the Quinean
picture the relevant causal constraints do not go far enough to provide clear in-
dividuation conditions for determining the referents of utterances: causal con-
straints only go so far as to give us likely candidates, like rabbits and rabbit stages.
And he is quick to note that, given cases of deferred ostension, inscrutability runs
deeper than we want to acknowledge. Deferred ostension occurs when, for exam-
ple, one indicates the gas tank is full by pointing toward a gasoline gauge. Quine
takes his examples of radical translation to amplify the indeterminacy exemplified
by cases of deferred ostention. Hence, a native's utterance ''gavagai''—rather than
meaning 'rabbit'—could just as likely mean 'our main-course this evening', since
we cannot be sure of the intended sense by which to interpret the utterance.
But deferred ostension is far from intractable once we step 'outside' isolated
cases and locate them in a wider causal network involving the causal histories of
a speaker and the things to which she refers. In the preceding example, the prima
facie inscrutable pointing gesture is resolved by appeal to causal accounts of both
how we know what gauges are for and how they work. Making such an external
shift works to disambiguate the gesture and get us to the 'full tank'-referent. So,
whereas obscurities surrounding radical translation can make the task of specify-
ing a referent very difficult, there is no reason to believe that such cases are in prin-
ciple insoluble. Understood in this way, referential inscrutability can be viewed
as the consequence of other 'social' constraints on the forging of explanations—i.e.
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limitations on material resources, technology, individual perseverance, and time.
Indeed, failure to provide a satisfactory causal story at a certain point in time
fails to rule-out the possibility of forging one at some future stage of inquiry. De-
ferred ostension and radical translation certainly pose profound challenges to our
giving precise accounts of our referential system, but they fail to pose an in princi-
ple obstacle to the forging of an acceptable account of those practices. Rather, they
pose precisely the kind of deep scientific challenges whose difficulty motivate fur-
ther research and creative analysis.6
2.3.2 Field
Hartry Field (1975) employs a kind of permutation argument in an attempt to show
the truth of a certain conventionalist thesis about reference. For Field, a scheme of
reference for a language is an account that stipulates which words of the language
are names, what the names denote, which words of the language are predicates,
and what these predicates are true of. The thesis runs roughly as follows. If a given
account of reference is adequate, then many such accounts are adequate, and the
choice of one account over another is only a matter of convention. Field attempts
to show that, given our adequate account of reference, another account can be had
by considering a systematic permutation of the physical universe. So, for any ref-
erence scheme S for a language L, a very different scheme Sϕ can be constructed for
the universe with a permutation that satisfies the same sentences. The permutation
runs along these lines: if S says a name-symbol refers to x then Sϕ says the same
name-symbol refers to ϕx; if S says a predicate-symbol holds of just those things
with property Q then Sϕ says the same predicate-symbol holds of those things x
such that Q holds of ϕ≠1 x. Whereas Putnam's permutations involve operational
constraints that are fixed, Field does not stipulate their invariance, so causality
(or any similarly conceived naturalistic constraint) is immediately up-for-grabs.
Assume, for example, that under our own scheme of reference the utterance of a
name is causally connected with x and not ϕ x. Field claims that, despite the role
causal relations happen to play in S, in Sϕ it would be ϕ-causality underwriting
the reference of names, which amounts to a scheme of ϕ-reference.
Field arrives at the preceding conclusion because he holds the view that when
we appeal to causality in the context of reference it is, in some sense, arbitrary—we
have, in his words, ''chosen'' to employ the notion of causality in order to find the
6Here I mean to suggest recent work in theoretical neuroscience aimed at giving a causal/ infor-
mational account of reference in the context of representational mental content. See, for example,
Eliasmith (2000).
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''…physical underpinnings of the concept of reference that people actually em-
ploy.'' (Ibid: 384) Furthermore, Field claims that we might have arrived at the same
(or better) results by having chosen ϕ-causality over causality, and that we have
chosen causality only because an ''…arbitrary decision is already built into the ordi-
nary usage of 'refer'.''(Ibid: 379; my emphasis) Moreover, the causal theorist owes
us more argumentation in order to ground that causality is superior to -causality.
The upshot is that, for Field, proper names and natural kind terms cannot be fixed
by causality because 'causality' is just another term in the theoretical domain that
is susceptible to permutation. This is indeed both a peculiar and radical view, and
one echoed by Putnam.
The causal relations we should feel safe to employ in our analyses of refer-
ence are the ones successfully applied in sciences like biology, chemistry, physics,
as well as those appealed to in 'softer' sciences like economics and psychology.
Causal explanations in these sciences generally tell us why some particular out-
come or some general pattern of outcomes occurs. A distinguishing feature of
such explanations is that they show how what is explained depends on other dis-
tinct factors, where the dependence in question has to do with some matter of
empirical fact, rather than for logical or conceptual reasons. When we consider
scientific explanation in the context of the semantic view of theories, function map-
pings are made according to a commonsense framework where an array of causal
relation-types are pre-theoretically assumed to obtain. These same relation-types
are assumed to be conditions that constrain our judgment about when empiri-
cal sentences are true—that is, they feature among the 'operational constraints' on
theory. Field's view is that one can permute the referential assignment of those
pre-theoretic terms that give us purchase on empirical content. The problem is
that he wants access to the very constraints that steer our interpretive practices to
the effect that commonsense causal terminology like 'touches', 'sees', etc. become
'ϕ-touches', 'ϕ-sees', etc., and this implies that our accounts of biology, chemistry,
etc. are likewise conventional.
Convention, construed in the strong sense, pertains to decisions made among
members of a community. But in both commonsense and scientific contexts it is far
from clear that causal explanation is conventional in this strong sense. Indeed, if it
makes sense to say that we can choose a language, the language choice will always
be relative to some aim; for example, to communicate, convey specific information,
state facts, etc. Hence, relative to the aim for which we want a language, not all
language candidates are suitable or on par. Grover Maxwell (1962) has suggested
that when it comes to the adoption of a linguistic framework suitable for develop-
ing scientific theories, the language should, as a condition of adequacy, allow for the
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development of explanations. Field clearly conceives of theories as linguistic, and
he considers the attempt to determine a causal scheme of reference for such theo-
ries an attempt to legitimate the relation as a physical one. But, he also contends
that the choice to specify the relation between some relata as causal is arbitrary.
That is to say, he takes our intuitive notion of what constitutes a cause to be a
mere matter of convention.
A problem for Field is that we take such causal specifications to convey genuine
information about the kind of relation into which the designated relata fall, and
not merely about the way in which we use the term. That is to say, we take such
designations to be indicative of features of the world, and not merely about the
way in which we happen to perceive it. Our designation of certain relations into
kinds thus elicits considerations surrounding both the context of explanation and
the nature of our sensory apparatus.
In Part III I examine the extent to which a causal theory of reference provides a
satisfactory account of reference for natural/ theoretical languages. In the follow-
ing subsection I detour momentarily to introduce the important notion of a causal
context of explanation, as well as the view that we are physiologically/ psycho-
logically disposed to construe interpretive contexts in science as causal.
2.4 Causal Contexts
The view that causality cannot be jettisoned from certain explanatory contexts
is bolstered when we consider a different thought experiment from Field (1982).
Consider an alien species that has evolved radically different sensory/perceptual
modalities from our own. As a result, the aliens recognize joints in the world that
we do not. Moreover, their ability to predict and explain features of the world is on
par with ours, yet they do so without employing concepts like 'cause and effect',
'molecule', 'quark', etc. Clearly the alien is a being who interprets the world using a
fundamentally different interpretive scheme than we do—one involving concepts
we cannot comprehend due to constraints on our contingent physical constitu-
tion.7 Assuming we can grant the possibility of such a being, does its existence do
any work to show that, in certain contexts of explanation, invoking causality is,
7Field (1982) raises the possibility of such beings in order to challenge Putnamís specific char-
acterization of metaphysical realism; namely, the premise that realists believe there is exactly one
true and complete description of the world. There seems to me no problem with my transposing
the alien thought-experiment into this context, since Field clearly takes their existence as a genuine
possibility.
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for us, just a matter of convention and one we might have otherwise passed over?
Clearly it does not.
To the contrary, what Field's story implies is this. The concept of causality is
an artefact of our physical constitution that arises with the attempt to give a sense
to certain phenomenal features of the world. It is unproblematic to claim that the
decision involving which languages to adopt in stating a theory might involve
elements of convention (e.g. we might have alternatively decided to explain the
world in a language associated with supernatural design) but we cannot say the
same of causality if the theory is meant to explain some phenomena in a relevantly
causal context.8 Causal contexts involve perceived asymmetries between purported
causes and their outcomes; that is to say, If A causes B, then B does not cause A. To
borrow a famous example, consider a flagpole casting its shadow on a sunny day.
We can explain the length of the shadow by way of the flagpole's height relative
to the sun's position at a given time, but we cannot explain the flagpole's height
by way of the shadow's length relative to the sun's position. Indeed, we can derive
the flagpole's height with the requisite data, but this does not explain the flagpole's
height in the sense whereby we explained the shadow's length. And this is so
because it is obvious and intuitive that the sun and flagpole together cause the
shadow and not vice versa. So, even if Field were to formulate an alternative mode
of explanation jettisoning causality in the context of interpretation, it does nothing
to shore up the conventionalist view of causality in any strong sense.
Rather, Field's hypothetical extraterrestrials imply the following. Given our
physical constitution, we are disposed to represent certain features of the world
in certain ways, just as those features we represent are themselves disposed to be-
have in certain ways. We infer everyday instances of causality due to varying de-
grees of palpable continuity in our representations of the world; specifically, where
those continuities suggest discernable causes and apparent effects relative to our
explanatory aims. Causality is thus anchored to both our sensory/ perceptual fac-
ulties and our specific aims (i.e. explanation). Hence, causality is conventional, but
8Here I certainly do not mean to suggest that causal contexts constitute the only means by which
we do our scientific explaining. There are a host of legitimate non-causal modes of explanation;
e.g. explanation via identification. This is exemplified by the discovery that temperature is identi-
cal with mean molecular motion. Explanation enters the picture when we consider that increasing
the temperature of a gas increases the level of pressure. There are certainly underlying causal pro-
cesses at play, and there is a sense in which the identity might alternatively be explained in causal
terms, but given the context of explanation the ëheavy liftingí is done by the less cumbersome and
symmetrical identity between temperature and mean molecular motion. In addition, it should be
noted that in explanation we also employ things like models and analogies which, likewise, are
not straightforwardly causal.
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only in the weak sense that had certain features of the world been different, those
differences might have precluded any knowers from using the concept. However,
causes are epistemically inherent to creatures like us whose explanations assume
the world to consist of spatiotemporal, property-bearing objects that fall into rela-
tions.
In the section below I discuss Putnam's notorious argument that, like any other
concept-term in our language, 'cause' is ''just more theory'' and hence susceptible
to reinterpretation. We have seen this view implicit in Quine's arguments for ref-
erential inscrutability from proxy functions, and overt in Field's conventionalist
view of reference. I will survey and critique some of the objections made by other
authors to Putnam's 'just more theory' argument in order to both clarify where
they err, and to marshal support for the view I offer and defend in Part III.
2.5 The ''Just More Theory'' Gambit
The 'just more theory' argument surfaced as a rejoinder to criticism from propo-
nents of causal theories of reference (e.g. Devitt, 1980), where Putnam claimed
that ''cause'' is just another term in our domain of discourse and thus susceptible
to reinterpretation. In later works Putnam augments his argument to cover any
supposed natural constraint on reference. He sketches the matter as follows:
Suppose there is a possible naturalistic or physicalistic definition of ref-
erence…Suppose
(1) x refers to y if and only if x bears R to y
is true, where R is a relation definable in natural science vocabulary
without using any semantical notions (i.e. without using 'refers' or any
other words which would make the definition immediately circular).
If (1) is true and empirically verifiable, then (1) is a sentence which is
itself true even on the theory that reference is fixed as far as (and only
as far as) it is determined by operational plus theoretical constraints…
If reference is only determined by operational and theoretical con-
straints, however, then the reference of 'x bears R to y' is itself indeter-
minate, and so knowing that (1) is true will not help. (1981: 45-6)
Putnam believes that knowing all instances of (1) are true does not answer the
problems raised by the MTA because the argument shows that in every permuted
world the truth-value of (1) is true. And this is particularly troublesome when,
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after permutation, the logical role played by R in (1) is supplanted by an entirely
different relation (e.g. x2 refers2 to y2 if and only if x2 bears R2 to y2). Moreover,
there will be just as many dissimilar relations R1…Rn ≠ 1 as there are permuta-
tions to the universe of discourse. Hence, according to Putnam, it is illusory to
think a special reference relation has been defined because R's explanatory power
is equivalent to R2's.
Putnam's claim that any available (indeed, any possible) naturalistic, reductive
account of reference amounts to 'just more theory' and is thus subject to system-
atic reinterpretation is the issue of primary concern here—in fact, it is the deal-
breaker. To allow the claim would be to provide Putnam with shelter against any
constraint on reference whatsoever, provided it features in the theoretical domain
of discourse. Fortunately, we need not allow the claim for reasons made clear by
David Lewis (1984: 225).
Constraint C is to be imposed by accepting C-theory, according to Put-
nam. But C-theory is just more theory, more grist for the mill, and more
theory will go the way of all theory…C is not to be imposed just by
accepting C-theory. That is a misunderstanding of what C is. The con-
straint is not that an intended interpretation must somehow make our
account of C come true. The constraint is that an intended interpreta-
tion must conform to C itself.
Lewis' point is that there is a crucial distinction between, on the one hand, mod-
eling a proposed constraint via some intended interpretation—i.e. making a state-
ment about the constraint come out true—and on the other, the interpretation itself
conforming to the very constraint that appears in the theory. The move—an exter-
nalist shift—sees the problem as a consequence of the internalist point of view from
which Putnam argues, where each new theoretical term is co-opted by global the-
ory. Lewis' idea is that the constraint is not something we impose on ourselves,
from within; rather, it is imposed by what we find in the world, where we, as
knowers, feature among the things we find.
The point also highlights, albeit indirectly, how theories expressed in the 'se-
mantic' format are, in a sense, insulated from Putnam's maneuver. The semantic
view of theories does not address the question of how an interpretation is fixed: the
intended interpretation is already assumed to be correct. As Demopoulos (2003: 392)
observes: ''[The semantic view] presupposes the pragmatic background within
which the models that are the theory are given and within which the semantic
view is expressed.'' So, whereas a theory stated in the Carnap-Ramsey format is
susceptible to permutation—since the empirical ground for its interpretation has
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been reduced to a set of formal sentences—the model-theoretic format anchors
terms to the world via an interpretation that is both governed by the constraints in
question, and ex hypothesi assumed to be correct. So, to accept natural constraints
on reference is to accept that the constraint in question is, in some important sense,
theory transcendent, since it forms the basis upon which theory can develop in the
first place. In Part III I will examine this notion of theory transcendence in greater
detail.
Putnam's 'just more theory' manoeuvre indicates that he has overlooked Lewis'
key observation.
''Causal connection'' is attached to R by causal connection, not by meta-
physical glue, they write. But this is, in fact, just to say that R (causal
connection) is self-identifying. This is to repeat the claim that a rela-
tion can at one and the same time be a physical relation and have the
dignity (the built-in intentionality, in other words) of choosing its own
name. (Putnam, 1984: 7)
I certainly do not mean to suggest that naturalistic constraints have ''built-in
intentionality'', so Putnam's rejoinder suggests (to me, anyway) that he has over-
looked the far-reaching consequences of his own stricture; namely, that of holding
operational constraints invariant. Recall that the pre-analytic and pragmatic basis
for an intended interpretation involves, among a host of other considerations, the
existential assent of an array of metaphysical categories; namely, objects, prop-
erties and relations, all of which feature in the operationalization of theory. But
Putnam's stipulation that we hold operational constraints invariant entails invari-
ance of these pre-analytic notions (and their corresponding terms) prior to permut-
ing reference. However, Putnam's methodological restriction provides sufficient
constraint to preclude radical reinterpretation of theory.
The invariance of operational constraints so severely limits Putnam's legitimate
permutative options that it is difficult to imagine a permutation that could produce
importantly different interpretive results from the scheme we presently employ.
Indeed, we still face the Quinean problem of referential inscrutability, where the
proposed constraints only limit us to salient referential alternatives. But this sort
of tame inscrutability is, for the most part, an inexorable consequence of having
to transmit the content of thought using vague language. Nevertheless, we still
manage to communicate and successfully interpret the content of our thoughts
and theories using language. Moreover, the inscrutability brought about by de-
ferred ostension poses no especially stubborn problems once we avail ourselves
of the relevant causal/ explanatory resources (in addition to ones from language
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pragmatics and commonsense). The burden therefore falls on Putnam to model an
alternative referential scheme that shows his desired result while actually holding
operational constraints constant.
Azzouni (2000) has also observed that Putnam's notion of operational con-
straints is ill-conceived and, ultimately, responsible for his arriving at the paradox-
ical view that naturalistic constraints are themselves subject to reinterpretation.
Specifically, he observes that Putnam runs together the notions of 'operational con-
straint' and 'observational constraint', supporting the charge by pointing to cases
(in specific papers) where Putnam uses the phrases interchangeably without draw-
ing any distinction between the two. Azzouni takes the equivocation to indicate
that, for Putnam, operational constraints in fact do stop at the observational level.
If this is indeed Putnam's view it is pretty obviously false. Consider, for example,
a practicing physicist who causally interacts with particles using devices designed
specifically for such purposes.
At the proximate end of the causal chain, ''observational'' predicates
apply, but at the other end they don't. Operational constraints, on the
causal picture, cut deep into the world—they don't stop only at what
we ''observe,'' and, consequently, to honor their restraints we must ac-
cept that they fix more than just appearances. (Azzouni, 2000: 166)
On this picture, 'operational constraints' subsume causes that run so deep as to
carve nature at joints that elude our straightforwardly observational vocabulary.
This picture is consonant with results in modern physics, where technology allows
us to track causal interactions with unobservables and collect empirical support for
inferences about their microstructures.
In the following, closing chapter I examine the prospect for an externalist ac-
count of reference for natural kind terms. In addition, I examine reference in the
context of naturalism and discuss features of the ontological picture inherent to
the externalist picture of the world.
Chapter 3
''Mine's not an idle cause.'' - Shakespeare
3.1 Externalism and Internalism
The causal, or external, approach to semantic content has been influential in terms
of providing a plausible account of the mechanism of reference for proper names
and natural kinds. That is to say, it accords with some basic intuitions about the
way the reference relation seems to work in natural/ theoretical languages. Saul
Kripke's (1980) landmark case for a causal theory of reference for names and nat-
ural kinds evolved from perceived inadequacies afflicting the description theory
of reference. Kripke points to specific cases that seem to be intuitive examples of
successful reference, then purports to show that we do not have the conceptual
resources to refer in a way that accords with the traditional descriptivist account.
In other cases he argues that the descriptive analysis implies the intuitively wrong
result—that the thing we are referring to via description is, in fact, something other
than the thing we initially seemed to refer to. Rather than focus on Kripke's specific
arguments, more important for my purposes are the considerations that motivated
his external shift in strategy.
The contrast  between Kripke's  externalist  move and that  of internalists, or
descriptivists, involves  important  disparities  in  their  respective  philosophical
projects. They disagree over which assumptions are problematic, and over how
to best characterize the relevant philosophical problems facing a theory of refer-
ence. Recall that descriptivists like Russell and Carnap begin with what they take
to be the most basic constituents of thought: our phenomenal experience. They
consider our phenomenal knowledge to be both fundamental and unproblematic,
and they each provide (albeit, problematic) accounts of how we might move be-
yond mere phenomena to form a conception of an external world. Stalnaker (2007)
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has aptly characterized this approach as an attempt to explain our representational
resources for a wider domain in terms of given resources for a narrower domain.
When viewed in this way we can see how such an approach could give rise to a
framework consisting in an observation/ theory dichotomy, and how an answer
to the quandary might be assumed to reside in a clarification of the logical and
semantic relations between the two.
Externalists, on the other hand, hold that, given the internalist's starting point,
they cannot hope to achieve satisfying answers to skeptical challenges—that is,
they cannot evade what we earlier saw Hempel call the 'theoretician's dilemma'.
Thinkers and speakers cannot, according to the externalist, have the perfect and
complete acquaintance with properties and relations that is required by the in-
ternalist to grasp propositions expressed in a descriptive analysis. Externalists
therefore allege that further reduction would be required of those phenomenal
properties and relations. To escape the skeptical dilemma the externalist proposes
that we start with the world in which we reside and use the resources offered by
commonsense and our best theories to tell us about it. That is, we do not begin
with 'sense data' or 'percepts' and attempt to bridge the divide between observa-
tion and theory. Instead, the externalist emphasizes our objective conception of the
world: the commonsense view of a world consisting of objects , properties and
events that fall into relations.
Externalists are motivated by the problem of how to reconcile this common-
sense picture with the evident fact that the world contains knowers that operate
from a purely subjective perspective. At the hub of the externalist project is the view
that general terms, along with names and other singular referring expressions, de-
pend for their semantic values on environmental conditions. This view owes pri-
marily to arguments advanced by Putnam (1979b) and Burge (1979), and has come
to dominate the overall philosophical debate over the nature of mental content in
recent years. Externalists hold that if it is indeed the case that certain terms depend
for their semantic values on external conditions, our intentional relations to their
referents cannot have the kind of foundational status that the internalist project
requires.
The debate between these contrasting viewpoints is  characterized by their
charging one another with unjustifiably assuming something that requires further
explanation. The internalist is skeptical of the commonsense picture sketched by
the externalist because it begins with entities, events, properties and relations to
which we are not, on their view, directly acquainted. They take any assumption
involving the theory-independent existence of such things to be either an unwar-
ranted slide or an article of metaphysical faith. Externalists, on the other hand,
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see the internalist's rejection of the commonsense ontological picture as perverse,
given its intuitive force and—they argue—its centrality to our scientific picture
of the world. Chiefly, they see internalists as having at the core of their project
an uncritical acceptance and a flawed conception of our knowledge of what we
experience. Externalists argue that internalists take for granted phenomena—e.g.
sense data, percepts, etc.—which themselves demand explanation. Moreover, ex-
ternalists argue that the best way to investigate such phenomena is under the aegis
of science, which already assumes the externalist picture.
My sympathies—if not already obvious—are with the externalist, so my aim
in the remainder of this concluding chapter is to argue for an externalist approach
to the problem of reference/ interpretation. However, I conclude that, whereas
the externalist project obviates the skeptical challenges that beleaguer internalist/
descriptivist accounts, reference remains elusive even on the externalist picture.
3.2 Natural Kinds and the Causal Theory of Reference
Natural kinds (and/or natural properties) are sometimes touted as the 'building
blocks' of the sciences. To assert the existence of natural kinds is to accept a meta-
physical thesis about the way the world is structured—specifically, that it has a
distinct and mind-independent natural kind structure, where the world consists
of objects, events and relations that are structured in such a way as to make those
structures discernable to us.
Consider a sample of something we can genuinely claim to causally interact
with; say, an element, like phosphorus, or a biological kind (exemplified by two
creatures capable of producing offspring together.1) Alternatively, a sample might
consist of events; say, an egg-hatching or a volcanic eruption. The first two sam-
ples are each presumed to instantiate a corresponding class of object, or entity.
The latter two samples involve events, where a cluster of conditions give rise to an
event-kind. We also refer to kinds that are the causes of events that we use to iden-
tify the kind in question, such as when we say someone who exhibits a distinctive
cluster of symptoms has 'the flu'.
Causal interaction with samples has enabled for the rigorous systematization
of kinds in the natural sciences, and classifying samples has made it possible for
us to make ampliative and reliable generalizations about the way they will behave
under certain conditions. Such is the process from which scientific laws are born.
1The obvious exceptions include those hermaphroditic biological kinds (e.g. worms, plants,
etc.) that reproduce by themselves, as well as bacterium, etc.
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But in order to state scientific laws we require a predicate that holds of everything
that is the same as the samples we have on index. Hence, a problem prior to the
demarcation of kinds involves determining what it means for one sample to be the
same as another.
To determine sameness we might, for example, enumerate a list of properties
exemplified by our samples in-hand and use a conjunction of those properties as
necessary and sufficient conditions for picking out a kind's extension. However, it
may be the case that the properties appealed to are neither necessary nor sufficient
to determine a kind. Whereas it may prima facie seem that two samples are the same
at a certain stage of investigation, it may later be revealed that they are, in fact,
very different. In the case of scientific classification, such problems are handled
via stipulation, where the best available methods for investigating a subject matter
are relied upon by experts, who then tell us, to the best of their reckoning, what
the requisite conditions for membership in a kind are. Causal theorists usually
stress that terms denoting natural kinds should be taken to reference classes of
property-bearing objects and events, as opposed to mere clusters of properties,
which we then associate with specific samples. That is to say, such terms should
be understood as referring directly to the 'real' members of a kind.
When we encounter a novel sample and assign it a name, the process is some-
times called a dubbing, or baptismal, ceremony; sometimes it is called reference-
fixing. The process subsequent to reference fixing is reference borrowing, where
ensuing speakers—ones often ignorant of the details surrounding the kind's dub-
bing—refer to kinds by the name assigned at its dubbing. The idea is that under-
lying a borrower's use of a term is a causal chain of borrowings extending back
to the events surrounding the kind's baptism. That is to say, we borrow the term
from others through linguistic communication. Putnam (1979b), who has devel-
oped this idea in great detail, analyzes the meaning of a natural kind term into
four components: a syntactic marker, a semantic marker, a stereotype, and an ex-
tension. On this picture, a term like 'tiger' has as a syntactic marker, ''noun''; as a
semantic marker, ''animal''; as a stereotype ''large, furry, orange and black-striped
cat''; and as an extension, the set of creatures that have the same internal 'tiger-
structure' as specified by experts. Hence, Putnam takes the meaning for natural
kind terms to obtain in a ''division of linguistic labor'' (1979b), where the borrowing
process mainly involves transfer of a kind's stereotype, and where the demarcation
and extension of a kind is specified by the relevant experts.
Perhaps the most serious challenge to the causal theory of reference involves
the supposed problem of reference change. Gareth Evans (1982) famously points
to the island of Madagascar as providing an example of such change. The island is
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located off the southeastern coast of Africa, but was mistakenly named 'Madagas-
car' by the explorer Marco Polo. 'Madagascar' was originally the name given to an
area on the mainland coast of Africa. However, Polo misconstrued the name's ref-
erent and his error was able to flourish due to subsequent reference-borrowings by
readers of the maps and navigational charts he produced based on his travels. The
problem is that Polo did not intend to introduce a novel use of the name. Rather,
he believed himself to use 'Madagascar' in accord with the intentions of the person
from whom he borrowed the name. However, his error constitutes a genuine case
of reference change because, despite our knowledge of the mistake, today nobody
is taken to be promulgating error when they refer to the island as 'Madagascar'.
A causal theory of reference handles the preceding problem by recognizing that
a name is typically grounded in its bearer via successive perceptual confrontations.
That is, despite our knowledge that reference change occurred due to an error in
reference borrowing, we should take Polo's initial error to be semantically signif-
icant and thus view it as a kind of revisionary dubbing ceremony. The idea is
that, given a sufficient number of erroneous borrowings over a sufficient period
of time, reference change is a possible, even likely, outcome. Hence, reference
for 'Madagascar' shifted from the mainland to the island once perceptually-based
groundings in the island (via borrowing) were established.
Reference change for natural kinds poses a different problem for a causal the-
ory. In science, reference change usually indicates errors made in the naming pro-
cess of a kind, and usually results in the kind's abandonment. New technology
and novel discovery sometimes show that what we once took to belong to a kind
in fact belongs to another kind, or that we were altogether wrong about the req-
uisite conditions for a sample's membership in a specific class. For example, once
technology enabled us to analyze the structural composition of rock we learned
that the term 'jade' had been used in reference to two distinct kinds of silicate rock
sharing an uncanny ostensible resemblance. The error therefore occurred at the
purported kind's dubbing, prior to any borrowing, where it went unrecognized
that the rocks contained distinct aggregations of silicate minerals. Hence, the sub-
sequent dubbing of 'jadeite' and 'nephrite' constitute baptismal ceremonies for new
kinds, while jade is no longer taken to specify a genuine natural kind, despite sus-
tained and pervasive use of its stereotype.
Examples like the foregoing motivated Devitt and Sterelny (1987: 72) to argue
that the reference of natural kind terms must involve a structural component. On
this view, the scope of a kind-term is taken to range over all and only those objects
that have the same internal structure as an available sample. The causal theory,
it is held, offers an account of causal interaction with samples where ostensible
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properties form the basis for reference. Yet, according to the foregoing view an
account appealing solely to ostensible properties cannot be sufficiently robust to
demarcate the scope of a kind. Relevant similarities in the ostensible behaviour
of samples give rise to intuitions about what might constitute a kind, but their
designation as falling under a specific kind will ultimately involve an appeal to
internal, structural similarities uncovered and/or inferred by rigorous scientific
investigation. To borrow a well-worn example, ice and water are the same kind not
due to ostensible properties they share; rather, despite contrasting appearances,
their being members of the same kind owes to their shared internal structure.
The problem this poses for the externalist is considerable: a comprehensive
causal theory for natural kind terms must provide a distinctively causal account
of reference for all theoretical terms. This is so because, if the preceding view is cor-
rect, the reference for a natural kind in science is conceived as a function from its
concept and expressed using other theoretical terms to specify its internal struc-
ture. Certain samples belong to the extension of a kind-term because they are
judged the same as the samples giving rise to the kind-term's baptism; and same-
ness of internal structure in a range of samples is what shows the extension of a
kind-term to be non-arbitrary. So, if Devitt and Sterelny are correct, the burden of
reference for natural kinds is shared by both an explanatory account delivered in
terms of causal interaction with samples during reference-fixing, and a conceptual
clarification of the term using extant observational/ theoretical language.
Indeed, the challenges facing the external approach are substantial, but the
point an externalist wants to emphasize is that, even if one were to concede that
singular reference to natural kinds in science is conceptually direct, it does not fol-
low that there is no causal/explanatory story to be told about what it is in virtue
of which a theoretical term refers. That is to say, it would be a mistake to confuse
an account of how terms come to be used in reference with a conceptual analysis
of what that term expresses. Clearly the 'theoretical environment'2 in which a new
kind-term is subsequently embedded bears some of the burden for specifying its
reference in the actual practice of science. The important point for the externalist is
that, despite our ability to specify reference in science via other theoretical terms,
our use of each theoretical term must be underwritten by some causal chain of
events, whether accounted for or not. Internalists, however, take the reference re-
lation to be exhausted by an account of the logical and semantic relations between
observation and theoretical languages, and the outcome is a globalist picture of
language/theory, where each new theoretical term is just another element in our
domain of theoretical discourse.
2The phrase ëtheoretical environmentí owes to Psillos (1999): 285.
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3.3 Naturalism and Constraints on Reference
Advocates of permutation arguments—usually internalist/descriptivists—attempt
to show that constraints on the interpretation of language are weak due to the
apparent global character of language/theory. Global descriptivism, on David
Lewis' (1984) rendering, runs roughly as follows: The intended interpretation of
a theory's language is the one that assigns things, etc. in some part of reality to
the terms of the language such that the theory comes out true of that part of re-
ality. Under global descriptivism each new term is part of the global theoretical
language, and this, according to Putnam et al, renders theoretical terms suscepti-
ble to systematic reinterpretation. Conversely, semantic externalists take the com-
monsense realist interpretive framework—the one that comfortably assumes the
objective existence of objects, events, properties and causal relations—to preclude
the possibility of radical referential reinterpretation.
Some semantic externalists take the priority of the commonsense framework
to imply a kind of philosophical naturalism. Naturalism comes in various stripes,
and involves a variety of theses, but central to it is an avowal of the existence of nat-
ural kinds/ properties. Lewis (1984), for example, rejects global descriptivism for
a metaphysical naturalism that purportedly answers the question of how newly
introduced terms are to be understood in a growing language—that is, how to get
more reference when we have some already. Lewis calls his view of language 'local
descriptivism': new theories give rise to new terms, so we should understand such
new terms as referring to things that are as described in the old terms of that new
theory so as to make the new theory come out true (if possible). For Lewis, theoret-
ical terms refer only if there is a unique realization of a theory's Ramsey sentence,
so there cannot be multiple realizations of entities that satisfy the observational
consequences O of a theory. 'Uniqueness', on the Lewisian view, should be un-
derstood as an exclusive extensional relation ER that structures the relevant domain
such that the theoretical terms existentially quantified in a theory's Ramsey sen-
tence stand in ER to O. The uniqueness requirement mirrors Carnap's method for
showing how reference can be made to theoretical entities, but Lewis departs from
Carnap by extending genuine metaphysical status to those existentially quantified
classes. Hence, the Lewisian uniqueness requirement translates as a requirement
that the domain is already carved into genuine ontological kinds.
Recall that, for Lewis, there can be no answer to the problem of interpreta-
tion if we regard all theoretical terms as equally eligible for providing content in
a sentence+. But to regard virtually any proxy function as equally eligible—as
is held to be the case by Putnam et al—is to ignore apparent constraints on our
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referential practices. Lewis continues:
Only if we have an independent, objective distinction among proper-
ties, and we impose the presumption in favor of eligible content a pri-
ori as a constitutive constraint, does the problem of interpretation have
any solution at all. If so, then any correct solution must automatically
respect the presumption. (Lewis, 1983: 55)
In other words, in order to avoid falling prey to permutation arguments we must
assume that only certain eligible sets of kinds constitute the extensions for predicates
denoting our theoretical/ natural kind terms.
However, Lewis' solution is bound to face criticism from certain other natural-
ists because his ''a priori constitutive constraint'' is really just a stipulation, since
only after scrutinizing our referential practices is it evident they are governed by
constraints. An ontological naturalist like Lewis—one who holds that things that
exist must exert some causal influence in the concrete world—should cry ''foul''
over the mere presumption of eligible kinds. Realism entails that the eligible sets
exist, and that they do so independently of knowers, but for Lewis to stipulate a
natural distinction among properties/kinds without offering a positive causal ac-
count of our ability to access them violates the strictures of his own naturalism. In
other words, Lewis needs to explain—in causal terminology—why we should re-
spect the presumption in the first place, or be willing to face charges of occultism.
Putnam (1981), for example, pejoratively characterizes the strategy of postulating
objective joints as one of conjuring a ''magical theory of reference''.
The problem for Lewis is that, if one asserts that natural constraints govern our
referential practices, we should require a naturalistic account of those practices
that explains our ability to access the eligible sets and the relations they fall into.
That is to say, Lewis needs to provide a positive causal theory of how we come
to know the kinds (or at least appeal to an established one) that warrants postu-
lating the ones he does. In view of this, it should come as no surprise that causal-
informational-representational3 theories are in vogue among theorists attempting to
naturalize mental content. However, despite his failure to honour the strictures of
his own naturalism, we should acknowledge Lewis' observation that natural con-
straints indeed govern our interpretive practices. In II. §4 & 5. I offered arguments
in favour of the view that permutation arguments which aim to deflate the deter-
minacy of reference arise from a failure to acknowledge the genuine primacy of
such natural/causal constraints on reference. I then argued that such constraints
3Examples of causal theories can be found in Dretske (1981, 1988, 1997) and Cummins (1996);
and for a two-factor approach in Eliasmith (2000).
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indeed obtain and suggested that this is evident where causality transcends the-
ory. In the next section I digress somewhat to introduce an ontological framework
which, on my view, helps to illuminate the sense of such theory transcendence.
3.4 Internal and External Questions
In his famous paper ''Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology'', Carnap (1956) out-
lines a complex set of distinctions that separate ontological questions as either 'in-
ternal' to a language or 'external' of a language. Since its introduction Carnap's
view has been regarded by many as flawed, and this is due, for the most part, to
criticisms leveled by Quine (1976). Despite the extensive opposition to Carnap's
view, I nevertheless concur with the likes of Michael Friedman (1999), Graham
Bird (1995) and David Chalmers (2006), that a careful examination of Carnap's po-
sition reveals deeper distinctions that, when acknowledged, deflect Quine's criti-
cisms. Assuming the Carnapian framework4 I intend to show how the notion of
causality is indeed theory-transcendent.
Bird (1995) observes and emphasizes that Carnap's internal/external divide ac-
tually consists of a four-fold distinction of types of ontological questions. Among
internal questions Carnap separates 'particular' from 'general' questions. The idea
is that if we develop a language replete with syntax, vocabulary, rules, and test
procedures, we can then, in principle, settle any questions of the internal-particular
type. Carnap provides examples from what he calls the 'thing language' for phys-
ical objects, and from the 'number language' associated with basic arithmetical
operations. The former constitutes an 'empirical' system, and the latter, a 'logical'
system. When such languages are available, answers to questions from the thing
language such as, ''Is there a stapler on my desk?'' can be resolved. Similarly, we
can answer questions from the number language like, ''How many prime numbers
less than 10 are there?''. Both languages provide an apparatus with which to an-
swer such questions—the former by way of empirical procedures and the latter via
a priori reasoning.
General-internal questions, by contrast, are exemplified by such broad ques-
tions as ''Do physical objects (in general) exist?'', and ''Do numbers (in general)
exist?''. Carnap makes two observations about such questions. First, as internal
questions they can be answered by appeal to the answers of certain particular-
internal questions. So, if there is indeed a stapler on my desk, and staplers con-
4In particular, to the one as appears in the revised version of ''Empiricism, Semantics and On-
tology'' appearing in Carnap (1956).
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stitute physical objects according to the given linguistic system, then it follows
logically that there exist physical objects; mutatis mutandis for the general-internal
question about numbers. Hence, general-internal questions pose no more of a
problem than their particular counterparts. The idea is that such questions presup-
pose the internal apparatus of either the thing-language or the number-language.
The second of Carnap's observations about general-internal questions is this.
When philosophers raise questions like ''Do numbers exist?'', they tend not to do
so in the sense characteristic of the general-internal question. Rather, they ask the
question in a sense independent of the internal apparatus. So, whereas general-
internal questions might be restated as, ''Does X feature in affirmative existence
claims in sentences of the linguistic system?'', the sense in which such questions
usually arise, according to Carnap, is more akin to, ''Are there principled reasons
for X's inclusion in the linguistic system (or, more generally, are there principled
reasons to accept the linguistic system as a whole)?''. Carnap calls such questions
'external', and he points out that, despite the potential for such sentences to share
the same linguistic form as certain general-internal questions, the content of the
question when conceived externally is importantly distinct from its content con-
ceived internally.
Carnap takes a further step, separating external questions into two categories:
first, 'practical' and second, 'theoretical'. Practical-external questions can be formu-
lated as follows: ''Are there good reasons to adopt the X-language?''. Carnap takes
such practical-external questions to be legitimate ones arising 'outside' the linguis-
tic system, with the system (or specific aspects of it) featuring as their subject mat-
ter. These are the appropriate sorts of questions to examine prior to the adoption of
a language by assessing and weighing the benefits of acceptance against the disad-
vantages of non-acceptance. That is to say, answering practical-external questions
involves making practical decisions, and the process of doing so, according to Car-
nap, should not be taken to involve notions like 'truth' and 'evidence', which only
apply to questions that arise internal to a linguistic system.
The  final  quadrant  of  Carnap's  ontological  mosaic  consists  of  theoretical-
external questions: for example, ''Are universals objective features of the world?''
Carnap considers the other three types of question— particular-internal, general-
internal, and practical-external—to be the intelligible species of existence question;
but he maintains that, in spite of its notable intellectual heritage, there is no ade-
quate interpretation for this fourth type of question. For Carnap, the requirement
for identifying a legitimate ontological question is that it have a clear interpreta-
tion. The theoretical-external form, according to Carnap, has no such interpreta-
tion—it has nothing to which one might appeal in order to prove a determinate
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answer. Chalmers (2006) has characterized such theoretical-external questions as,
in general, asking whether there are objective, theory-independent proofs for the
basic questions of what exists. Consider that, with respect to particular-internal
questions, we can turn to either the system's empirical or logical apparatus to
provide answers. General-internal questions can be answered by appeal to the
answers of specific particular-internal questions; and practical-external questions
are decided via a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis. Theoretical-external questions
cannot, according to Carnap, be given a sense in any of the preceding ways. Bird
(1995; 44) has remarked that such questions are, to some extent, defined by their
exclusion from the group of interpretable, ontological question-types.
The preceding Carnapian framework for ontological questions is, for the most
part, a suitable guide by which to assess ontological questions. Indeed, there have
been important objections to Carnap's scheme—ones I cannot devote space in this
essay to—but Friedman, Bird and Chalmers persuasively defend Carnap's anal-
ysis, showing its immunity to the popular criticisms. My reconsideration of his
model attempts to clarify the primacy of our commonsense conceptual scheme,
emphasizing its priority to theory. In other words, I exploit Carnap's system to
show how one might decide answers to ontological questions regarding the more
general elements of this scheme.
3.5 The Ontological Status of Causality
Philosophers like Putnam (1983a); van Fraassen (1980; 112-16), Field (1975) and
many others, have objected to the assignment of any special ontological status to
causality. This deflationary stance harkens Hume's (2000) classic discussion of
causality, where he famously argued that we cannot observe causes at work but,
rather, theoretically impose them onto situations we observe. For Hume, the prob-
lem that causality poses is a skeptical one: how might one justify the inference that
causes exist as part of the external world, and do so from one's own evidence, when
the evidence to which one can appeal is limited to the contents of one's immedi-
ate sense experience, where causes simply do not feature? Hume's solution to the
problem—a forerunner of Kripke's strategy and one largely ignored by Humean
skeptics—involves making a shift that assumes the individuals in this skeptical
quandary to be constituents of the world who make inferences about it, and to ask
how they do so, why they infer as they do, and why they are as successful as they
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are.5 Internalists, however, see any such shift as rendering the externalist's causes
as both interest and context-sensitive. Hence, internalists generally take causality
to be merely conventional.
In II. 4. & 5. I conceded that causality is conventional but only weakly so,
in that a successful natural science without causality might have been possible
had characteristics of our physical constitution been different. But causality, I ar-
gued, should not be taken as conventional in the strong sense—that is, as being
grounded by agreement in society. Our knowledge of causes is indeed dependent
upon our contingent neurophysiology, but this in no way precludes them from
having genuine ontological standing. Just as one can benignly assert that objects
like mountains and rivers exist, one can likewise assert that certain events exist.
Consider that, just because an explanation E specifies event-C as a cause, and
C happens to be context and interest-sensitive to E, it does not mean that C's place
in the broader complex of possible causal agents is strictly context and interest-
sensitive. Despite the epistemic and pragmatic importance of C to E, our reasons
for singling out C as just one aspect in a larger causal complex has no bearing on
C's ontological status. It certainly does not follow from this that C does not exist
because any theory in which C features will already assume that it does. Of course,
it may be the case that C does not really exist, but C's non-existence does not fol-
low from the fact that with other interests and in another context one might not
be inclined to specify C as salient to, say, E*. Hence, the question of C's existential
status is orthogonal to whether C in fact plays the role it is specified to play in E.
To put the matter somewhat differently, if one is at all willing to grant ontologi-
cal status to events, then an appeal to C in an explanation (qua cause) should be
understood as a specification of that event's genuine influence in bringing about a
specific outcome.
Critics of the causal theory of reference sometimes claim that many of the intu-
itive, commonsense causal relations appealed to by externalists are scientifically
illegitimate. Specifically, in order for causality to underwrite reference one should
be able to supply necessary and sufficient conditions for acts of reference in 'sci-
entifically respectable' terms. But how is this requirement anything more than an
echo of what the internalist takes to be an acceptable answer to the problem of
reference? Indeed, the internalist critic is only attempting to reassert the terms of
5Credit for this observation goes to Stalnaker (2007), who in his recent John Locke Lectures
points to the analogy between Humeís solution and Kripkeís shift. Stalnaker remarks that, whereas
Hume raises this as a possible escape from the skeptical dilemma, he indeed takes the skeptical
problem more-seriously than most externalists are inclined to, and also expresses some reticence
about employing it.
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debate. The externalist, on the other hand, sees no chance of escaping the skeptical
quandary on the internalist's terms and instead offers an account of the conceptual
resources we use to form beliefs—an account that assumes causality and deploys
it to form an explanation of how we acquire and use those resources. In addition,
the externalist emphasizes our obvious capacity for finding our way about reliably
in our environment and offers an explanation for that capacity. Hence, externalists
use the very methods they are assessing to arrive at the conclusion that the world
is conducive to the success of those methods, and this is taken by externalists to be
the only way to escape the skeptical quandary. The internalist's rejection of this
strategy amounts to a rejection of Hume's answer to the skeptical problem without
offering a comparable, or satisfying, 'exit strategy'.
Azzouni (2000) has suggested that the internalist's objection can be answered
by noting that the causal relations appealed to by externalists are often complex
gross regularities6 that are epistemically independent of the natural sciences and
which naturally admit of exceptions. Externalists will usually agree there is no un-
problematic definition of 'refers' in scientific causal terminology, so they take the
term to be a kind of shorthand for the mechanism underwriting our conception of
how to use a given natural kind term. Some have expressed this by claiming that
the commonsense causes appealed to by the externalist supervene on 'scientifically
respectable' microcausal events. But even proponents who frame the matter as
such acknowledge that the supervenience conditions are too complicated to spec-
ify (for now, anyway). Recall that the model-theoretic approach assumes theories
to be underwritten by a commonsense framework that guides the interpretation of
a theoretical language. In light of this, Azzouni's gross regularities should be seen
as the kind of causes (or some subset thereof) that are assumed and implemented
in reference fixing and the operationalization of theory. From the methodologi-
cal point of view, we implicitly assume the commonsense framework to be cor-
rect—indeed, it must be assumed correct in order for us to successfully interpret
a language/theory. Externalists can therefore answer charges that commonsense
causal relations are scientifically suspect by pointing to the vital role they play in
6In I.6 of Azzouni (2000: 63), he outlines a theory of ''gross regularities'' which he describes as a
''boundary layer'' between scientific theories and their domain of application. He continues, ''The
irreducible status of (many of) the laws of the special sciences to physics, and of (many of) the
laws of other special sciences that (metaphysically speaking) underlie them has its analogue in the
irreducible status of a body of knowledge about middle-sized objects that, strictly speaking, does
not belong to any science; we, as lay-persons and as specialists, rely on a body of knowledge about
such objects that is only partially reducible to any science what hands-on experience and craft teach
are…gross regularities. Some of these regularities are expressible in language, but many are items
of kinesthetic ''know-how'''.
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the interpretation of scientific theory.
In the preceding section I introduced the Carnapian scheme as both an ac-
ceptable outline for assessing legitimate ontological questions and a framework
by which we might affirm ontological commitment. When we assess causality in
light of this framework it helps to illuminate the sense in which causality might
be considered an event-kind that transcends theory. Recall the four-fold distinc-
tion of question-types: particular-internal, general-internal, practical-external and
theoretical-external. Internally construed, causality features pervasively in our sci-
entific language. Consider a particular-internal question like, ''What are some of
the common causes of HIV infection?'', or a general-internal question like ''Does
causality play a role in medical science?''. Determinate answers to the former are
provided via the deductive or inductive apparatus internal to the relevant lan-
guage, and once answers to the former (and other questions like it) are provided,
an affirmative answer to the latter is obvious.
On the other hand, ontological questions surrounding causality become more
interesting when assessed in light of the external perspective. Practical-external
questions concern the acceptability of entire languages or specific features of those
languages. Earlier I described such questions as being decided via practical cost-
benefit analysis. But prior to that I argued that causality should not be seen as be-
ing grounded in communal agreement. Specifically, my claim was that causes are
events in the natural world, the knowledge of which are contingent on there being
creatures like us (or other creatures suitably endowed) to infer them; moreover,
we cannot help but invoke causality in certain contexts (also, given certain as-
sumptions about what exists, such as concrete objects, events, relations, and time).
So, whereas causality may not be a metaphysically necessary constraint on refer-
ence—i.e. it need not be invoked as the mechanism of reference in all possible
worlds—it is, nevertheless, a constraint on the way in which we take the referen-
tial relation to work for non-formal languages. Causality, so understood, should
be seen as only weakly conventional.
Clearly we did not, at some point in time, entertain practical considerations
over whether or not to adopt causality as part of our conceptual framework. We
do, however, entertain such pragmatic considerations when questions arise over
the ontological legitimacy of certain postulates (e.g. the luminiferous aether), or
in the selection of alternative frameworks of explanation for special phenomena
(e.g. subatomic events, where causality does not feature as an explicit part of the
explanatory framework). Setting such special cases aside, causality seems a fixture
for medium-sized interpreters like us who cannot help but intuit the world as spa-
tiotemporal. Cartwright (1983) has persuasively argued that, despite it's apparent
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dispensability in certain branches of physics, abandoning causality would cripple
the vast majority of the sciences. She concludes, on this basis, that until physical
theories account for the causes we employ in other sciences, they are incomplete.
Recall, as well, Lewis' observation that causality oversteps theory by constraining
our interpretation of the very languages/ theories in which the term 'cause' is used
to denote a genuine kind of event or relation. These considerations suggest that
causality is indeed theory/ language transcendent, which is to say that it features
among the most general, pre-theoretic structures at work in our thought about the
world.
This proposed transcendence is explicit when we examine explanatory frame-
works assumed in the study of our means of access to the world. Take, for exam-
ple, the aforementioned externalist strategy for naturalizing mental content, where
an explainer invokes the very notion she is explaining. In causal-informational-
representational accounts of mental content, the causal exchange of conserved en-
ergy between 'bodies' is assumed as part of the physiological explanation of our
ability to infer high-level, commonsense causes (i.e. gross regularities). It is a case
of an explainer assuming in their explanans the same relation which features as the
explanandum. Indeed, there are important differences between the kinds of mi-
crocauses that occur at, say, the molecular level, and those that are invoked at the
level of gross regularities. The former are usually construed in aggregate, labeled
causal processes, since each salient microcausal event in a process plays roughly
the same role in an explanation of our ability to perceive some macro-level causal
event. However, when abstracted and recast in the general form of 'C caused E,
there is no important difference between causes at the micro and macro level.
Causes—like objects, events, certain properties, and certain other relations—un-
ambiguously feature in our best theories about the world. Recall, however, that
under the Carnapian framework one cannot point to the elements of a theoretical
domain as providing theoretical-external questions with a sense. Carnap is correct
that a term's mere appearance in a language cannot bestow metaphysical reality
on its specified referent in our theoretical domain. But causality's place 'outside',
or antecedent to, theory can be taken to provide such a sense. This stance cer-
tainly runs afoul of Carnap's ontological views, but in his presentation he fails to
acknowledge the distinctive status of general ontological categories like objects,
events, properties and (causal) relations. Such categories precede a specified do-
main of scientific discourse, and they function as the basis upon which such the-
ories are constructed. To acknowledge as much, and to make the external shift in
perspective is a legitimate way to avoid Hempel's dilemma. Regrettably, internal-
ists are unlikely to concede the objectivity of causality since, for them, 'objective' is
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term applicable only to those properties with which we are acquainted, in the Rus-
sellian sense. Hence, causality will not count because we are not acquainted with
causes—we theoretically impose them into the domains where they feature. Ex-
ternalists, in contrast, emphasize that pre-theoretic commonsense leaves no ambi-
guity over the objective existence of causality and its metaphysical cohorts. More-
over, they see both the practice of natural science as methodologically dependent
on their supposition, and the impressive success of our best theories as their vin-
dication.
3.6 Natural Kinds and Realism Revisited
Contemporary  causal-informational-representational  theories  offer  compelling
theoretical  accounts  of  mental  content  assuming a causal  theory of  reference.
However, that a causal approach can be made to work as successfully in an ac-
count of the semantic content of our scientific theories is not as obvious. Indeed,
our ability to refer to many natural kinds is undoubtedly the result of causal inter-
action between samples and those who investigate their inner structures. How-
ever, even if we set aside the conceptual problems surrounding the determination
of sameness among samples—problems that are 'resolved' by stipulation—causal
theories of reference continue to face another set of problems.
In science, the naming process for a natural kind involves various stages of
investigation that include, among others, detection, classification, confirmation
and, finally, naming. Consider this in the context of Azzouni's earlier example
involving the physicist who causally interacts with individual atoms using mod-
ern technology. A thoroughgoing naturalist treatment of natural kinds and, more
broadly, theoretical terms would need to involve operationalizing the theories the
physicist deploys in her investigations, since operationalization gives an account
of the procedures followed in the measuring of each property attributed to a kind.
Operationalization would therefore track the various causal process involved in
the investigative stages leading to the naming of, for example, some new particle.
However, even operationalizing theory cannot entrench a given causal account
of semantic reference for natural kinds. On the one hand, operationalization works
to systematize the overarching causal process and offers a scientifically legitimate
means of tracking the relevant causal processes responsible for our interactions
with samples. But giving an account in terms of extant scientific procedures is
problematic for a metaphysical naturalist due to the ever-changing nature of such
procedures: old ones are continually abandoned for new ones and this affects the
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status of preceding accounts if we are to assume, as science does, that newer pro-
cedures are superior to older ones. Moreover, newer procedures often produce
different results from older ones. So, just as science undergoes continual revision,
so will any naturalistic rendering of semantic reference for a natural kind term
or theoretical term in causal terms. Of course, this poses no serious problem for
the methodological naturalist of the Quinean stripe, but it illustrates why a meta-
physical naturalist/realist like Lewis sees the causal approach, on its own, to be
inadequate.
Indeed, the gap between the referential scope of a term and our ability to un-
derwrite that scope via causality will vary from term to term, and given a linguistic
division of labour it will also vary over time. Furthermore, as Lewis (1984: 227)
observes, sometimes a causal theory is just ill-suited to explicate a particular case
of reference.
The causal theory often works, but not as invariably as philosophers
nowadays tend to think. Sometimes an old-fashioned descriptivism
works better; sometimes there are puzzling intermediate cases in which
causal and descriptive considerations seem to tug in opposite direc-
tions.7
Lewis' discontent with a purely causal approach results in his looking elsewhere
for a bona fide constraint on interpretation, and he finds one in a 'natural hier-
archy' of eligible kinds (qua natural properties), where the world is ordered such
that only an elite minority of objects can be given tidy individuation conditions.
Things like fundamental physical particles reside at, or near, the apex, while less-
elite objects—ones much harder to individuate—like persons, bicycles and basket-
balls fare worse in the natural bureaucracy, but remain related to the fundamental
joints in nature. Earlier I claimed that Lewis' failure to provide a positive account
for his considering those specific sets as eligible, or as hierarchically arranged in
the way he takes them to be, would lead to criticism from other naturalists who
require a naturalistic explanation for choosing the joints he does. However, Lewis
seems quite content to leave the specification of elite kinds to the physicists and
take their claims at face value. This is certainly a reasonable strategy, but given the
problems of theory change and changing procedures, any appeal to extant physics
as an arbiter renders Lewis' naturalism a species of methodological/ epistemolog-
ical naturalism. And this, of course, renders his claim of objective reality for such
joints an article of metaphysical faith.
7Peter Unger examines a host of such examples in sections 6 - 10 (pp. 21-43) of his, ''The Causal
Theory of Reference'', Philosophical Studies 43 (1983), pp. 1-45.
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Causal theories of reference can aid in showing the extent that causal resources
can work to underwrite the reference of natural kinds and theoretical entities. But
given the stated problems—science's apparent reliance on descriptions involving
theoretical terms, theory change, and the ever-changing procedures that enable for
substantive causal interaction with samples—the externalist must acknowledge
that the reference relation for natural kinds can be only partially and provisionally
underwritten by causality. Moreover, externalists must concede that the causes to
which they appeal in referential accounts of names and natural kinds bear on our
knowledge of those causes.
The issues surrounding realism that I engaged in earlier chapters are, to some
extent, orthogonal to questions surrounding the mechanism of reference. Exter-
nalists, as should be clear by now, are all realists to the extent that they are willing
to countenance, at the very least, the objective existence of some things that fall
under the metaphysical categories of object, event, property and relation. Lewis'
realism involves ranking these things according to our ability to specify clear in-
dividuation conditions for them. Hence, on the Lewisian picture, things that are
smaller and simpler have, in some sense, a higher degree of 'reality' than others.
Causes, too, seem amenable to a similar ranking heirarchy, where, say, the mea-
surable exchange of conserved energy between bodies constitutes an elite kind of
causal interaction, while the vague, difficult-to-measure causes taken to obtain be-
tween less-elite objects and events rank lower. However, some—myself among
them—prefer to think of the two as distinct kinds of causes, given the problematic
and counterintuitive results that the hierarchical approach gives rise to.
Consider that hierarchists like Lewis rank everyday, medium-sized objects
lower on the hierarchy than ones much smaller and easier to individuate, like fun-
damental particles. The problem with this view is that the former are both intu-
itively and empirically less-contentious—that is to say, we know they exist about
as well as we know anything. Constructive empiricists can therefore be seen to en-
dorse the inverse, since they reject sentences involving reference to unobservables
as truth valued. Rather than opt for constructive empiricism's own counterintu-
itive error-theoretic (or fictionalist, depending on who you ask) treatment of unob-
servables, the sort of proto-realism I advocate takes the preceding tension as a failing
of the ranking system itself. Instead, realist/ antirealist border disputes are solved
by granting genuine reality to the posits appearing in well-established scientific
theories, with special exclusionary provisions made for mathematical objects and
those idealized objects which figure in scientific laws and axioms. Ultimately, indi-
vidual commitment to the degree of objective reality for an object, property, event
or relation will vary among theorists—even among those assumed to be working
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within the seemingly parochial confines of either 'ism'.
3.7 General Conclusion
A curious feature of the reference relation is that, in certain contexts, it functions as
an ideal relation that hangs on an intended interpretation for the theory/language
in question. In mathematics, for example, the natural numbers can be given a set-
theoretic reduction whereby each natural number refers to its set-theoretic coun-
terpart.8 The reference relation is thus perfect and unambiguous, and this is char-
acteristic of domains whose elements are wholly abstract. The internalist approach
mirrors such accounts where the reference relation is conceived to be conceptually
direct. The important difference, of course, is that internalists speciously assume
this model to suffice in contexts where the relevant domain consists of concrete
objects and events. The problem with any such approach is that it cloaks the im-
portant story that accounts for constraints on our referential assignments via some
mechanism. Hence, the internalist approach gives rise to supposed problems of
referential reinterpretation, like the ones emphasized by permutationists.
The point I mean to accentuate is this. Even where a referential relation is con-
ceived as a function from a term to a concept for some worldly thing, underwrit-
ing that concept is a complex causal interaction (whether accounted for, or not)
that allowed us to detect (in some cases, derive), classify and ultimately name the
item, and hence enable us to continually specify members of the term's extension.
Putnam's unwillingness to recognize the forcefulness of this point is the model-
theoretic argument's central failing.
A similar problem might be said to afflict truth, which also functions ideally in
formal contexts once an interpretation is given, yet staggers when applied to natu-
ral language sentences whose content is meant to capture features of the concrete
world.
The preceding considerations suggest that notions like reference and truth are
'at home' in a purely formal context. Their deployment in languages used to de-
scribe the world should therefore be conceived as closely analogous to that of ap-
plied mathematics: specifically, to assume a role similar to that of geometry in
the study of physical objects. Given this, any question that implicitly treats truth
and/or reference as a purely non-formal notion is sure to encounter problems.
Hence, we should expect attempts to define reference and truth in terms of causal-
8Admittedly, this is a contentious point in the philosophy of mathematics, but it is illustrative
of a context where the reference relation is ideal.
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ity and correspondence to encounter the pitfalls they do. However, if we conceive
of reference and truth in the recommended manner—as paradigmatically ideal re-
lations—a host of philosophical problems surrounding these issues dissolve.
The type of proto-realism I endorse makes no brazen metaphysical claims
about there being a fact in nature about how the things we refer to must be in-
dividuated in order for claims to be true. Rather, contingencies like the specific
nature of human physiology and the state of a scientific community at a given
stage of human development are taken to influence the causally relevant units we
use to specify an interaction. Both our ability to successfully communicate in or-
dinary language and the impressive success of modern science suggest that, to an
important degree, we have indeed identified some of nature's joints. Are we not
therefore referring to them? Perhaps. But the history of science admonishes that
we should expect to discover a good deal about nature's joints that is not already
implied by even our best theories.
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